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INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of a constitution is to establish a govern-
ment that operates in the public interest. Unfortunately, in fis-
cal matters, the United States Constitution has become progres-
sively less effective in realizing this goal. One problem is that
the federal government appears to have lost the ability to limit
its spending. Since the early part of the twentieth century, fed-
eral expenditures have grown consistently in both good and bad
economic times and under both Republican and Democratic lead-
ership, with domestic federal spending now consuming over sev-
enteen times the percentage of national income than it did in
1910.1 A second problem is that the goals of federal spending
1. In 1910, the federal government budget for domestic spending was 1.1% of the
gross national product. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, His-
TORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 224, 1114 (1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL
STATISTICS] (providing data for calculation). In 1995, it was 17.3% of the gross do-
mestic product. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 390 (1997) (providing data
for calculation). We chose 1910 as a baseline because it marks the decade immedi-
ately before the passage of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments-when the
process of centralizing the government began. See infra notes 110-19 and accompany-
ing text. (Our 1910 figure is based on gross national product while our 1995 figure
is based on gross domestic product because the government recently changed the
way it measured national income. Fortunately, the quantitative differences between
gross national product and gross domestic product generally are not significant, see
Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INTL L.J.
1999] 367
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
have changed radically. In the last several decades, expenditures
on public interest goods-goods that the public desires but the
market cannot supply adequately-are being crowded out by
spending on private interest goods-goods that merely transfer
resources from one group to another.2 The federal government
thus spends ever more money and is ever less focused on pro-
moting the public interest in its spending decisions.
Under current law, these changes in the size and composition
of federal spending are destined to continue. The Social Security
and Medicare programs are likely to expand dramatically in the
next several decades as baby boomers retire.' At that time, gov-
ernment spending will balloon to unprecedented levels and in-
clude an even greater percentage of transfer payments.4
This transformation of federal spending from a modest budget
devoted to public interest goods into a vast engine for the pro-
duction of private interest goods has had several harmful conse-
quences. First, there has been a surge in inefficient spending
that has reduced the size of the economic pie.5 Second, taxes
have increased to sustain that spending, which has depressed
personal income and hindered economic growth.' Finally, the
429, 475 n.141 (1997), and certainly not significant enough to affect the broad histor-
ical trends on which we rely in this Article).
2. See Robert P. Inman & Michael A. Fitts, Political Institutions and Fiscal Poli-
cy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG., Special Issue, at
79, 79-82 (1990) (describing shift to transfer payments from public goods). Public and
private interest goods are defined more fully below. See infra notes 26-39 and ac-
companying text. A transfer payment is "a payment made by the federal govern-
ment ... to an individual . . . for which no current or future goods or services are
required in return." U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND FIN. MANAGE-
MENT DIv., A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS: EXPo-
SURE DRAFT (GAO Rep. AFMD-2.1.1, 1993). Transfer payments include "Social Secu-
rity benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, government retirement benefits, and
welfare payments." Id-
3. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE
AND TIMEs OF OUR NATIONAL DEBT 167 (1997).
4. See id.; A. HAEWORTH ROBERTSON, SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT EVERY TAXPAYER
SHOULD KNOw 51 (1992).
5. See infra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
6. See Robert W. McGee, Principles of Taxation for Emerging Economies: Lessons
From the U.S. Experience, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 29, 50 (1993) (discussing a Cato In-
stitute study that found that "tax increases President Bush signed into law in 1990
ha[d] retarded economic growth by 0.7%, destroyed 400,000 jobs, caused the unem-
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rise in government spending has resulted in the creation of ex-
cessive government debt as politicians have sought to shift the
costs of increased spending onto future generations.
Excessive spending on private interests has not merely pro-
duced financial disarray; it also has contributed to the decline in
our political culture. A regime structured to produce public
goods unites the community by encouraging citizens to consider
what they have in common, but one that countenances large
scale transfer payments continuously pits citizens against one
another and saps public spiritedness.8 Although political theo-
rists and politicians call for a dialogue of reasoned deliberation
and decry today's factious politics, none addresses the most basic
cause of divisiveness-a government structured to be a dynamo
of private interest spending.9
Despite a series of much publicized efforts, Congress has
failed to halt, let alone reverse, the growing percentage of na-
tional income that the federal government spends. For example,
the Congressional Budget Act of 197410 was supposed to estab-
lish legislative procedures that would restrain unnecessary
spending, but spending and debt mounted instead. 1 The Gramm-
ployment rate to increase by 0.45%, and caused stock prices to drop by 15%").
7. The national debt has reached 5.2 trillion dollars and there were 28' consecu-
tive unbalanced budgets before the recent surplus. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FEDERAL DEBT: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 7-8, 12-15
(1996); infra note 150.
8. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 15-16
(1965) (discussing the common interests inherent in the provision of public goods).
9. For support for the proposition that the ideal of reasoned deliberation is the
object of government, see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword. Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 73-77 (1986). For
one of the many complaints regarding the divisive nature of our politics, see Tyrone
Beason, Panetta Hits 'Loud Voices Tearing This Country Apart," SEATTLE TIMES,
May 14, 1995, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File. Despite these
complaints, politicians in the short term may actually benefit from a regime that
divides people into interest groups because such groups will help the politicians stay
in office. See infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
10. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. §
105 and in scattered sections of 2, 15, 26, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
11. See James A. Thurber & Samantha L. Durst, Delay, Deadlock, and Deficits:
Evaluating Proposals for Congressional Budget Reform, in FEDERAL BUDGET AND FI-
NANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM 53, 53 (Thomas D. Lynch ed., 1991) ("Since the pas-
sage of the [Congressional] Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-
1999] 369
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Rudman Act'2 created a mechanism that would impose automat-
ic spending cuts to reduce the deficit, but when the pressure to
choose among programs became too great, the only automatic
aspect of Gramm-Rudman proved to be Congress's decision to
eviscerate the statute. 3 The Budget Enforcement Act of 199014
attempted to restrain spending through mandatory caps, 5 but
Congress now has chosen to spend at levels that exceed those
caps.
16
For all the self-congratulations of its creators, the 1997 budget
agreement followed this same pattern. The agreement did not
halt the growth in spending. In fact, the agreement explicitly
abrogated spending limits that Congress had previously im-
posed. 7 Consistent with past practice, in 1998 politicians appear
344), delay, deadlock, deficits, and ever increasing debt have been a regular feature
of congressional budgeting.").
12. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 7, 15, 16, 26, 31,
and 42 U.S.C.).
13. See James W. Bowen, Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment, 4 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 565, 619 (1994).
14. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 13001-
13501, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-573 to 630 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C.).
15. See id.
16. Congress has consistently attempted to camouflage its fiscal failures. When
Congress abandoned the Gramm-Rudman restrictions, it promised to conform to new
spending restrictions in the Budget Enforcement Act. See id. Similarly, when Con-
gress displaced the Budget Enforcement Act limitations, it did so as part of the cur-
rent budget agreement that pledged to reduce spending growth and debt in the fu-
ture. See George Hager, GOP, Clinton Snip Away at Spending Corps, ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN NEWS, May 25, 1997, at 2A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rmtnew File.
In short, Congress has repeatedly announced a new solution to our fiscal problem at
the same time that it has repudiated its prior solution. The public choice theories
discussed in Part I of this paper would predict this pattern because the elimination
of past restraints wins favor with special interest groups, while the announcement of
new restraints pleases the general public who are too rationally ignorant of politics
to appreciate that these restraints will be eliminated in due course. See infra notes
40-66 and accompanying text.
17. See Hager, supra note 16, at 2A (noting that the drafters of the current bal-
anced budget agreement consciously exceeded the fiscal 1998 cap on discretionary
outlays outlined in the 1990 budget agreement). Moreover, the budget agreement
balances the budget only for a few years, after which entitlement spending will cre-
ate substantially larger deficits than we now have. See Adam Clymer, After Tax
Bills, Congress Faces The Long Haul, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1997, at Al (describing
the results of the budget agreement between the President and the Republican lead-
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already to have exceeded the new spending limits in the agree-
ment.
18
This persistent failure to restrain the growth in private inter-
est spending suggests that our fiscal problems result not from a
passing failure of political leadership, but instead from the in-
herent tendency of our constitutional structure to encourage ex-
cessive spending.'9 To address these structural problems, a
growing number of constitutional amendments have been pro-
posed and voted upon. Both the Balanced Budget Amendment 0
and an amendment to require a two-thirds vote to raise taxes
have received the support of a substantial majority of legislators
in the Senate or the House.2 At the heart of both of these pro-
posals is the same mechanism-a requirement that certain
kinds of fiscal legislation attain the vote of a supermajority of
legislators. Despite the growing political support for
supermajority rules, no one has offered a theory of the
ership in Congress).
18. In this past budget cycle, despite protestations to the contrary, Congress went
over the budget limits with various devices. For instance, "emergency spending" was
made exempt from spending caps. See Robert J. Samuelson, This Year's Double-
Speak, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 1998, at 34. This "emergency spending" included spend-
ing on fixing Y2K computer problems that obviously could have been foreseen as oc-
curring in 2000 and spending on natural disasters, much of which could have been
budgeted for, even if the specific disasters were unknowable in advance. See i&o
19. The percentage of the GNP devoted to domestic spending in 1970, four years
prior to the beginning of the budgetary reform process, was 12.1%. See HISTORICAL
STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 224, 1114 (providing data for calculation). In 1995, it
was 17.3%. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 390 (provid-
ing data for calculation).
20. H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995). The Balanced Budget Amendment would re-
quire a balanced budget unless three-fifths of each house authorizes a budgetary
deficit. See id § 2.
21. The Balanced Budget Amendment failed to secure the two-thirds majority in
the Senate necessary for a constitutional amendment by a margin of 65 to 35 in fa-
vor of adoption. See 141 CONG. REC. 83314 (daily ed., Mar. 2, 1995). The amend-
ment effectively lost by only one vote because Senator Robert Dole voted against it
as a parliamentary maneuver to preserve his ability to bring the amendment for-
ward for reconsideration. See icL The House defeated the amendment requiring a
two-thirds vote to increase taxes by a vote of 233 to 199 in favor of adoption. See
143 CONG. REC. H1491, H1506 (daily ed., Apr. 15, 1997). Similar proposals are find-
ing renewed interest at the state level; anti-tax constitutional amendments have
been adopted by referenda in several states. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (re-
quiring that legislative bills to raise taxes obtain a two-thirds majority); NEv. CONST.
art. IV, § 18 (same).
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supermajority mechanism or a defense of its efficacy. This Arti-
cle attempts to fill this analytic void by proposing a theory of
supermajority rules that explains the distinctive advantages of
such rules as a method of government decisionmaking. In partic-
ular, we argue that supermajority rules often will be the best
decisionmaking rule when Congress should be restrained and
the courts cannot be trusted or are not equipped to enforce a
constitutional limitation.
We illustrate the utility of supermajority rules by considering
the appropriate governance of fiscal matters. Fiscal
supermajority rules have the prospect of restraining both the
amount of government spending and the percentage of private
interest spending.22 In addition to economic goals, these rules
also may promote a more harmonious political existence by mak-
ing it harder for interest groups to acquire other people's re-
sources for themselves. Although critics of fiscal supermajority
rules, including the Balanced Budget Amendment and the tax
amendments, view them as radical innovations, we argue that
such rules are better seen as the first drafts of a blueprint to
restore the Framers' vision of a limited government. This Article
builds on the ideas underlying these rules to describe the theory
and operation of optimal fiscal supermajority rules. Such rules
apply to government spending rather than to taxes or debt.
This Article will proceed in four sections. Section I suggests
that the fundamental pathology of modern spending patterns
stems from the superior influence that concentrated interest
groups wield with legislators, even though such groups are far
less than a numerical majority. This process creates a prisoner's
dilemma for a modern citizenry, almost all of whom are mem-
bers of some special interest group benefitting from some partic-
ular redistribution. Although most would be better off with a
smaller government, it would be irrational for members of any
interest group to surrender their subsidies unless members of
other groups agree to do the same. The present budget crisis is
in large measure a result of repeated iterations of this dynamic.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 180-222.
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Section I also explains how the provisions of the original Con-
stitution largely restrained such expropriation for over 150
years. Under the system of federalism, the federal government
could not undertake large-scale redistribution because it had
limited fiscal powers. The states also were prevented from such
governmental excesses because they competed for capital in the
interstate marketplace.
Unfortunately, the Framers' solution did not last. The original
Constitution, paradoxically, was undermined by its very success:
because it promoted a relatively stable society, interest groups
grew and prospered. Changes in economic circumstances also
diminished the effectiveness of the Constitution in restraining
interest groups. These forces culminated in the New Deal's re-
treat from constitutional federalism, which essentially permitted
the federal government plenary taxing and spending authority.
The dissolution of constitutional restraints transformed a limit-
ed government that was designed to deliver public goods into
today's special interest state.
Our description of the defects of the current constitutional
regime sets the stage for Section II of the Article, which pres-
ents a theory of how appropriate supermajority rules may re-
solve the prisoner's dilemma that has caused excessive spending.
We compare supermajority rules both to majority rules and to
absolute constitutional limitations-such as those created by
individual rights and the limitations that federalism places on
the central government.
We maintain that supermajority rules can be preferable to
majority rules for categories of legislation over which special
interests have particular leverage. Specifically, we describe how
applying supermajority rules to spending bills can improve the
balance between public interest goods and private interest
goods. If a supermajority rule were applied to all spending legis-
lation, Congress would enact only spending bills that command
a substantial consensus. Because private interest spending tends
to result in a substantial number of individuals who are net los-
ers, such spending often will fail to command the support of a
supermajority. Thus, fiscal supermajority rules should act as a
filter, posing a stronger barrier to the enactment of private in-
terest spending than to the passage of public interest spending.
1999] 373
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Supermajority rules in some areas also are superior to abso-
lute limitations, in part because they assign to the judiciary a
more limited role that comports better with the judicial function.
For instance, a supermajority rule applicable to spending legisla-
tion does not require the judiciary to decide whether legislation
is ultimately good or bad. That decision is left to the legislature.
Courts need not determine any fact about the legislation except
that it spends money. Supermajority rules therefore minimize
judicial discretion, giving the courts only the authority to make
judgments according to determinate rules.
Supermajority rules are also better than absolute limitations
in that they are likely to prove more enduring. When absolute
limitations prohibit legislation that is sought by a powerful po-
litical movement, the judiciary often comes under great pressure
to eviscerate these limitations through misinterpretation.
Supermajority rules, however, do not prevent the enactment of
measures supported by a broad popular consensus. Judges
therefore are under less pressure to misinterpret the categories
of legislation to which the supermajority rules apply. By bending
under the gusts of popular passions, supermajority rules are less
likely to break.
Section III describes the substantial social advantages that
supermajority spending rules will engender. We argue that such
rules will promote a polity that has more of the republican vir-
tues that the Framers sought. Because such rules make it hard-
er for citizens to use the government for their own narrow ad-
vantage, they help constitute a national citizenry that is more
likely to use the government for the common good and to sup-
port beneficial civic associations. Finally, supermajority rules at
the national level would revive federalism by restraining the
federal government and thereby inducing citizens to look more
to the states to resolve their problems.
Section IV addresses the most important objections to
supermajority rules. First, we argue that a fiscal supermajority
rule can be crafted in a manner that will not provide undue dis-
cretion to the judiciary. We then show that the appropriate use
of supermajority rules is wholly consistent with democratic theo-
ry, because it can lead to more equal political influence among
citizens. We also rebut the contention that supermajority rules
374 [Vol. 40:365
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will harm the poor by making it harder to redistribute resources
to them. We argue that a majority rule does not especially bene-
fit the poor because the poor are less likely than other groups to
be members of the coalition to which politicians tend to redis-
tribute resources. Finally, we show that a fiscal supermajority
rule is superior to campaign finance reform, the constitutional
innovation currently touted in the academy and the press as the
most effective solution to the problem of special interests.
I. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION AND THE
RISE OF THE SPECIAL INTEREST STATE
In this section, we discuss the nature of the Framers' charter
of limited government and its transformation into the Constitu-
tion of today's special interest state. This history has important
lessons that support the argument for constitutional reform.
Among other things, it shows that constitutive rules can operate
to constrain private interest spending, although there is a con-
sistent danger that these rules will be transformed into ones
that favor special interests.
A. The Dilemma of Politics and the Goal of Constitutionalism
The central dilemma of politics is that a government suffi-
ciently powerful to supply public interest goods also has enough
power to expropriate the property of its citizens. The science of
constitutions attempts to develop mechanisms that will empower
the government to provide public interest goods, but discourage
it from supplying goods that merely satisfy a particular group's
private interests.24 The best mechanisms for obtaining a high
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) ("In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself."); see also Barry R.
Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism
and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 24-28 (1995) (arguing that a
government that is powerful enough to protect private markets is powerful enough
to seize the wealth of the citizenry).
24. See infra notes 74-109 and accompanying text. Good government requires more
than the provision of public goods. Even organized crime syndicates typically limit
some kinds of violence and theft in their neighborhood, thus providing a public good.
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ratio of public interest to private interest goods will depend on
the culture and technology of the time.25
1. Distinguishing Public Interest Goods from Private Interest
Goods
Public interest goods are goods that the government can sup-
ply more efficiently than the market.2" Most goods are private
interest goods as a result of the benefits of the market and the
defects of government. The market provides incentives for pro-
ducing quality goods and services at the lowest prices, and those
prices in turn allocate the goods and services to the highest val-
uing buyers.2" In contrast, even with the best of intentions, gov-
ernment cannot produce as efficient a result because it lacks the
information the price system provides.28 Moreover, in practice,
government action often is distorted by powerful special interest
groups rather than guided by .the public interest.
29
The most important category of public interest goods is what
economists refer to as a "public good"-one that must be sup-
plied jointly and from the enjoyment of which it is impossible or
impractical to exclude people.3 ° The paradigmatic example is
national defense; because a private defense system necessarily
benefits all but cannot arise spontaneously through private con-
The problem is that the transfers that crime kingpins obtain for themselves through
their organization far outweigh the public goods they provide.
25. While we use economic terms to describe the norms by which our constitution-
al regime should be judged, we think this conception is broadly consistent with the
measures that other utilitarian and rights-based political theories would suggest. See
infra notes 110-43 and accompanying text.
26. In this Article, we employ the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency. Under
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, one state of affairs, S2, is more efficient than another, S1, if
in going from S1 to S2, the people who benefit from the change could compensate
the people who lose and still remain better off. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L.
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 186 (rev. ed.
1990).
27. See ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, ExCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COM-
PETITION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL 57 (1983).
28. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519,
519-20, 524, 526 (1945).
29. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 40-66 and accompanying
text.
30. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 11 (1989).
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tracts, it is best provided through taxes and government spend-
ing.31 The government may also supply regulations to address
externalities, such as air pollution, more efficiently than the
market because transaction costs make it impractical for the
large number of people affected by pollution to negotiate a con-
tractual solution.32 Other public interest goods include the rule
of law and the prevention of monopoly.
33
In contrast, legislation that simply benefits a particular group
provides a private interest good. Subsidies allocated to sugar
producers are an example. Such governmental assistance obvi-
ously does not qualify as a public interest good because there is
no need for the government to intervene; anyone who desires to
donate to sugar producers can easily do so. Moreover, govern-
ment subsidies are targeted at specific groups and therefore do
not meet the requirement that all citizens should benefit from a
public good.
Under certain conditions, however, some legislative transfer
payments may be deemed public interest goods. For instance,
it is conceivable that virtually everyone would be willing to pay
in order to reduce poverty.34 But even a citizenry with such a
universal preference may not be able to produce sufficient pri-
vate charitable resources because it would lack the power to co-
erce free riders-those who would prefer that others pay for
charity to satisfy their own preference for a society with reduced
poverty.
35
31. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 28 (1982).
32. See MUELLER, supra note 30, at 35 (showing that externalities and traditional
public goods provide the same rationale for government existence--to economize on
the transactions and bargaining costs of obtaining information on individual prefer-
ences regarding public goods and externalities when the number of individuals is
large").
33. See Aranson et al., supra note 31, at 28-29.
34. For these citizens, it would not be enough to see individual poor people
helped; their preference would be satisfied only if poverty as a whole was reduced.
35. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUIONAL DEMOCRACY 53-55 (1996). This argu-
ment assumes that what people care about is solving the entire poverty problem
rather than simply helping as many people out of poverty as possible. Cf RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? 38-39 (1997)
(arguing that charity can be provided successfully through voluntary associations).
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Under such conditions, curtailing poverty would be a good
requiring joint support, the benefits of which citizens cannot be
excluded from enjoying.36 The difference between legislation en-
acted on behalf of sugar growers and legislation enacted on be-
half of the poor 31 is that there is no plausible reason to believe
that all or most people would want to benefit sugar growers. 38 It
therefore is always fair to characterize benefits to sugar growers
as private interest goods.39
2. How Special Interests Skew Spending in a Democracy
One of the measures of a constitution's success is its ability to
prevent groups from using the government to obtain private in-
terest goods. In a democracy; one group that can succeed in ob-
taining such redistributions is the majority. Other groups, how-
ever, may also be able to expropriate resources.
Public choice theory has demonstrated that groups with cer-
tain characteristics may be able to exercise significant political
36. See MUELLER, supra note 35, at 55.
37. This free rider argument for governmental assistance to the poor assumes that
people are willing to pay to help the poor. Another argument for assisting the poor,
however, suggests that willingness to pay should not be the exclusive standard in
this area; under this view, even if people would not want to assist the poor, we may
still be confident, based on our ability to make basic interpersonal utility compari-
sons, that transferring resources to the poor would increase utility. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 463-66 (4th ed. 1992) (explaining the economic
arguments in favor of government efforts aimed at reducing poverty).
38. We recognize that the borderline between public interest goods and private
interest goods will be disputed. Groups that seek benefits from the government al-
most always provide "public" justifications for their programs, although to most in-
formed observers outside the group the programs would appear to be private interest
goods. See John 0. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1751, 1794 (1994) (book review) (describing the justifications that interest groups
create to rationalize their redistributive schemes). Marginal disputes concerning the
application of a distinction, however, do not mean that the disputed concept cannot
function as a useful criterion. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 4 (2d ed.
1994) (noting that many useful concepts have disputed areas of application).
39. We consider transfer payments private interest goods unless they command
the support of a large number of citizens. We believe that nearly all transfer pay-
ments, other than those involving the poor, would be classified as private rather
than public interest goods. To be sure, we observe many kinds of transfer payments
in a modern democracy but, as we discuss below, they are the product of rational
ignorance by most citizens and the power of special interest groups. See infra notes
40-52 and accompanying text.
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power even though they constitute a numerical minority. One
characteristic of such groups is that each member receives a
large amount of money from the government. 0 It therefore
makes sense for each member to spend time and resources at-
tempting to secure and protect these subsidies. Second, such
groups tend to have low organizational costs. 41 This often means
that a group has a small number of members, allowing the
members to reach decisions and monitor one another cheaply.42
Groups also may have low organizational costs if they can con-
strain free riders, preventing those who do not contribute from
benefitting from the group's political activities.43 Finally, these
minority groups can often obtain sizeable subsidies without pro-
voking significant opposition." If the group has few members,
each member can receive a significant amount individually, even
though the total cost to the public is relatively modest. By con-
trast, groups with a large number of members, such as consum-
ers or taxpayers, each of whom is affected only slightly by legis-
lation, will form effective political organizations only with great
difficulty.
45
Special interest groups exert their influence in the political
process in a variety of ways. First, they are able to monitor what
is actually transpiring in the political process, such as what leg-
islation is voted on and how it affects their interests.46 Second,
special interests can often use experts to persuade legislators of
their positionY.' Third, special interests are able to conduct a
coordinated and coherent campaign to publicize their position in
the media.' Finally, special interests also may exercise greater
40. See OLSON, supra note 8, at 144.
41. See id at 143.
42. See id,
43. See icL at 137-41.
44. See id at 144.
45. See id at 143.
46. See, e.g., Michael A. Andrews, Tax Simplification, 47 SMU L. REV. 37, 42
(1993).
47. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Ju-
dicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 17-21 (1984).
48. See William Dubinsky, Book Note, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1512, 1514 (1992) (re-
viewing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRm-
CAL INTRODUCTION (1991)) (stating that special interests can generate powerful pub-
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leverage over legislators through campaign contributions or in-
dependent political expenditures.49 By contrast, citizens who are
not members of special interest groups not only have less influ-
ence in the political process, but also remain "rationally igno-
rant" of much that occurs in that arena because their individual
votes are unlikely to affect political outcomes.5"
Due to these advantages, special interest groups often secure
disproportionate benefits. The power of a special interest group
may enable it to persuade a majority of the legislature to sup-
port its legislation, even though a majority of voters would not
support the legislation if those voters considered the issue.5' Ob-
servations confirm that politicians often favor legislative pro-
grams that provide concentrated benefits to a small group and
diffuse their costs over the public at large.52
Although both majorities and small, cohesive groups can exer-
cise leverage in the political process, groups that combine fea-
tures of these two kinds of groups also may exert tremendous
power in the political process. The best example of such a group
is the elderly, who combine the voting strength of a large faction
with the organizational advantages of a small one to secure
more funds from the federal budget than any other interest."
The power of the elderly is attributable to several factors. First,
elderly persons receive a large portion of their income from So-
cial Security and Medicare, and therefore have an incentive to
licity campaigns).
49. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 826-28 (1985).
50. Rational ignorance describes the systematic tendency of diffuse citizens to pay
little attention to political information. The phenomenon occurs because acquiring po-
litical information is both costly and unproductive. It is costly because to acquire
such information, individuals must invest time that they could be using in other
more lucrative or pleasurable enterprises. It is unproductive because the principal
instrumental use of such information is to guide voting, but the vote of any individ-
ual is unlikely to influence the outcome of an election. See MUELLER, supra note 30,
at 205-06.
51. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS 90 (1981).
52. See id
53. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Competitive and Cooperative Dependencies: The Case
for Children, 81 VA. L. REV. 2217, 2236-37 (1995) (discussing the power of the elderly
as a special interest group).
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invest resources to protect these entitlements.5' Second, the el-
derly exercise tremendous voting power 55 because they are a
large group with high voter participation rates56 and appear
willing to vote based primarily on the issue of protecting Social
Security and Medicare benefits.57
Finally, the structure of Social Security and Medicare enhanc-
es the leverage of the elderly.58 Because the elderly are such a
large group, one might expect that the increase in taxes neces-
sary to finance higher Social Security and Medicare benefits
would decrease significantly the net benefits the elderly derive
from increases in benefits. These programs, however, are funded
by payroll taxes that the current elderly will not pay unless they
are presently employed.59 Moreover, even if they are employed,
this increase in taxes will affect them only for the relatively
short period of their employment, compared to the lifetimes for
which it will apply to younger workers.60
54. See id at 2243-44 (observing that enormous entitlement programs for the el-
derly have given them disproportionate incentives to get involved in politics). The
effect of Social Security and Medicare on the elderly is an example of the manner in
which government programs themselves may provide incentives for interest groups to
coalesce.
55. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 288-94 (1995).
56. Those over sixty-five years old vote at three times the rate of those eighteen
to twenty-four, and at a higher rate than any other age group. See Cohen, supra
note 53, at 2244. The high voter participation rates appear to be attributable at
least in part to the additional leisure time the elderly possess. See POSNER, supra
note 55, at 148-50.
57. See POSNER, supra note 55, at 150, 290.
58. See id, at 289-90.
59. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Reconsidering the Income Tax Treatment of the
Elderly: It's Time for the Elderly to Pay Their Fair Share, 56 U. PITT. L. REv. 589,
609 (1995) (noting that few retired elderly pay Social Security taxes). Social Security
is not funded from general revenues, but Medicare is partially funded from such rev-
enues. See PETER J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECuRITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION 52
(1980). The prospect of increased income taxes necessary to fund general revenues
also is limited to the elderly, because Social Security benefits are not taxed unless
high thresholds are reached. See Forman, supra, at 609-10.
60. See POSNER, supra note 55, at 289-90. The opposition from the elderly to the
program for catastrophic insurance, which was funded largely by the elderly, strong-
ly suggests that there would be much less support for increased spending for the
elderly if Social Security were structured on a fully-funded basis, rather than on a
pay-as-you-go basis. See Elaine S. Povich, Congress Kills Catastrophic Medicare Plan,
REc. (N.J.), Nov. 23, 1989, at A18, available in 1989 WL 5546118 (noting that Con-
gress repealed catastrophic health plan after opposition from the elderly, who were
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One important feature of special interests is that they almost
always cause an increase in government spending by persuading
the government to subsidize their activities.6' Special interests
normally attempt to secure private interest goods through
spending programs that are narrowly directed toward them. 2
Earmarked spending programs exist for farmers,63 particular
industries,64 and other groups.65 Special interests receive a com-
paratively large proportion of the money spent on these pro-
grams. By contrast, special interests benefit much less from a
reduction in spending because the benefits that a special inter-
est derives from these reductions must be shared with the rest
of the public.66
3. Noneconomic Motivations for Spending Legislation
Although we maintain that citizens often take political actions
based on their narrow self-interest, we also believe, along with
the Framers, that citizens sometimes act out of moral and other
noneconomic sentiments.6 ' Each election confirms the broader
motivations of citizens when they vote even though they are
required to fund it with a surtax).
61. See HAYES, supra note 51, at 38.
62. See id.
63. Although the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7334
(Supp. II 1996)), reduced farm subsidies, it continues to confer significant benefits to
farmers.
64. See, e.g., Michael Axline, Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 26
ENvTL. L. 613, 619-21 (1996) (discussing federal subsidies applicable to the timber
industry).
65. See Jim Abrams, Legislative Ax Poised Over Corporate Welfare Programs:
Broad-based Coalition Wants to Cut a Dozen Federal Subsidies, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, July 5, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 11891587 ("The Congressional
Budget Office has estimated direct federal support for business at $30 billion a year.
The Cato Institute, a private think tank that promotes a smaller federal govern-
ment, has identified programs that subsidize industry at $85 billion a year.").
66. See OLSON, supra note 8, at 166.
67. See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 378 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) ("As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain de-
gree of circumspection and distrust: So there are other qualities in human nature
which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence."). For further discussion of
the provisions that reflect the Framers' vision of the admixture of human motiva-
tion, see infra notes 74-109 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40:365382
1999] SUPERMAJORITY RULES 383
very unlikely to influence the election and thus to obtain a re-
turn on the time they spend in voting. 8 Indeed, precisely be-
cause the results of elections do not depend on their votes, we
would expect that citizens will not vote only for narrowly instru-
mental reasons of acquiring more resources for themselves.6 9
Instead, they will use their vote for various other purposes, in-
cluding expressing their moral convictions or making a symbolic
gesture that they are the type of person who supports certain
programs.70
Expressive voting of this sort can have both positive and neg-
ative influences on government spending. It can lead to exces-
sive spending on untested or ineffective policies because citizens
may vote for a program based on symbolism rather than its ac-
tual operation.7 ' But expressive voting also can lead citizens to
support spending on actual public goods, such as defense and
law enforcement, based on moral conviction or symbolism. In-
deed, such spending is often the most popular component of po-
litical programs.
68. See MUELLER, supra note 30, at 348-69 (discussing the paradox of voting).
69. Professors Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky offer a comprehensive frame-
work for the relation between instrumental reasons and expressive reasons in voting.
See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE
THEORY OF ELECTORAL PROCEDURE 19-53 (1993). They postulate that individuals
seek both monetary and expressive returns from their acts. See id. In markets, indi-
viduals are more likely to decide on the basis of monetary returns than expressive
returns because their decisions will have direct monetary effects. See id. at 19-31. In
politics, however, because no vote is likely to affect the outcome of the election, the
monetary return from a vote is likely to be small. See id- at 32-37. The expressive
return (i.e., feeling that you voted for the best candidate) does not depend on the
outcome. See id Accordingly, even accepting the view that individuals have the
same basic motivations in politics and markets, one would predict that voters weigh
expressive returns more in political decisions than in economic decisions. See id at
32-53.
70. Of course, all expressive sentiments are not high minded. Individuals also can
vote to express envy or resentments. See id, at 48-49.
71. The rational ignorance of the citizenry can exacerbate this effect. Large spend-
ing programs may gain the attention and approbation of voters because of their
symbolic value. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFICIT$ MATTER? 228 (1997). Many such
programs thus will be proposed with much fanfare but little attention to their "real
merits and likely empirical effects." Id
72. See Richard Benedetto, Poll Points Toward Conservative Electorate, USA TO-
DAY, May 22, 1996, at 8A, available in 1996 WL 2056221 (noting majority support
for continued defense spending at current levels). Cross-culturally, in modern democ-
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Our inquiry into the efficacy of supermajority rules will pro-
ceed on the common-sense view that both narrow self-interest
and expressive sentiments motivate people. Consequently, the
best constitutional provisions are Janus-like73 with one side in-
hibiting groups that pursue their own private interests and the
other nurturing and harnessing people's sentiments for the com-
mon good. We hope to show that supermajority rules serve both
functions.
B. The Framers' Solution
The Framers' Constitution was successful precisely because it
created a panoply of mechanisms, suitable for its time, that en-
couraged the creation of public goods and constrained the pro-
duction of private interest goods. Indeed, the Framers' genius
was their recognition that although representative democracy
obtains a better balance of public interest goods to private inter-
est goods than either monarchy or oligarchy,"' it does not dis-
solve the dangers of expropriation. In a democracy, as in other
governmental forms, government may be used to unfairly benefit
some groups at the expense of others. Consequently, the Fram-
ers' Constitution contains several mechanisms that limit the
governmental production of private interest goods.
Perhaps the most important of these mechanisms historically
was that of constitutional federalism.75 The happy paradox of
racies, citizens appear willing to spend more money on fighting crimes as shown by
their support for longer incarceration of criminals. See Germans Want Judges to Get
Tough on Crime: Poll, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, July 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, AFP File (finding that 80% of Germans want tougher sentences); Dick Wil-
liams, A Different Approach Is Needed: Voters' Message Was Clear, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Nov. 29, 1994, at A24, available in 1994 WL 8918234 (finding that a very
large majority of Americans want truth in sentencing laws and more prisons).
73. In Roman mythology, the god Janus was represented by a two-faced head. See
6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRIrrANICA 496 (15th ed. 1993).
74. For a discussion of the superiority of democracy over such systems in this re-
spect, see Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AMi. POL.
SCI. REV. 567 (1993).
75. See Weingast, supra note 23, at 8-9, 18-21 (arguing that constitutional feder-
alism was historically the mechanism most influential in leading to substantial eco-
nomic growth with minimal redistribution). Federalism similarly has benefitted other
economies, such as contemporary China. See id. at 21-24.
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federalism is that a constitutional structure with two govern-
ments can result in less private interest spending than a struc-
ture with one. Under federalism, the national government may
exercise only circumscribed powers that limit its ability to enact
private interest spending.76 Moreover, state governments are
forced to compete with one another for capital, including human
capital, because the constitutional structure keeps open the free
movement of goods and people across state lines. This competi-
tion limits the power of states to spend for private interests.77
In the original Constitution, the enumerated powers con-
strained the federal government from undertaking redistribution
by confining its powers of taxation, regulation, and spending.7"
First, the Constitution carefully circumscribed the taxing author-
ity of the federal government, which limited the resources avail-
able for redistribution. 79 As Alexander Hamilton recognized, the
indirect taxes that the original Constitution permitted to be lev-
ied without formal limitation, such as duties and excises on ar-
ticles of commerce, "prescribe[d] their own limit." ° If such indi-
rect taxes became too high, people would stop buying the article
that was taxed.8 ' By contrast, direct taxes, such as taxes on
property, had weaker natural limits, but were constrained effec-
tively by the constitutional requirement that their revenue be
proportionate to the population in each state.8 2 Second, because
76. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (describing powers granted to Congress).
77. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights for Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 147, 149 (1992) (stating that federalism is a check on the monopoly power of
state governments because individuals and capital can migrate from state to state).
78. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
79. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (1994) (noting
the limits that the federal taxing power imposed on federal spending).
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
81. See id.
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (requiring that "No Capitation, or other di-
rect, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census"). Under the apportion-
ment rule, it was impossible to impose nationally uniform direct taxes (unless the
subject being taxed was distributed among the states in proportion to population).
See Erik M. Jenson, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes
Constitutional?, 97 CoLuM. L. Rav. 2334, 2342 (1997). Before the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, the scope of direct taxes was a matter of dispute. Although property taxes
consistently were thought to be direct taxes, Supreme Court decisions varied as to
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the regulatory power of the government was circumscribed, it of-
fered limited opportunities for spending °money. The govern-
ment's authority under the Commerce Clause to eliminate barri-
ers to free trade among the former colonies8 3 was not a blank
check for spending.84 Other ancillary powers, such as the author-
ity to provide uniform bankruptcy laws 5 and to operate a post
office, 6 also provided little justification for substantial spend-
ing. 7 The only other possible authority to spend money was the
Spending Clause,"8 but this authority was understood to be so
narrow in scope that it was not used to justify substantial
spending for the first 150 years after the Constitution's ratification.8 9
which other taxes were direct. In 1895, the Supreme Court held that a tax on in-
come from property was a direct tax. See Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429, 582 (1895). See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SU-
PREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at 24-26 (1990) (summarizing the
Court's holding in Pollack). This interpretation made it politically much harder to
impose a national income tax, because much of the income of the rich derived from
their property rather than their labor.
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with power to regulate
interstate commerce).
84. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 4, 17 (1987) (viewing the Commerce Clause as a charter for free
trade); David G. Wille, The Commerce Clause: A Time for Reevaluation, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 1069, 1077 (1996) (stating that the original purpose of the Commerce Clause
was to promote free trade).
85. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
86. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
87. See Tom Stacy, What's Wrong with Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 245-46
(1996) (stating that such ancillary powers have the same purpose as the Commerce
Clause in sustaining interstate economy).
88. The spending power generally is located in Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the
Constitution, which states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
89. It is beyond the scope of this Article to catalog all the possible ways that the
original constitutional settlement confined the spending power, but the following are
three of the most plausible. The first was embraced originally by James Madison,
who contended that the spending power could be used only to carry out some other
enumerated power. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Pow-
er, and the Limits of Consent, 12 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6 n.3 (1988). A second was the
requirement that the spending be on behalf of the general welfare. See Engdahl,
supra note 79, at 16-17. Judicial application of this criterion would invalidate a
large amount of current spending undertaken on behalf of special interests. A third
theory suggests that the spending authority can be used only for legitimate regulato-
ry purposes, and requires a close fit between the goals of the spending program and
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The Constitution left the remainder of domestic taxation, reg-
ulation, and spending authority to the states. 90 Although the
states were thus potential large-scale distributors of private in-
terest goods,9' the free movement of goods and people among the
states restrained the ability of state governments to extract
wealth from their citizens.92 If the states exercised their authori-
ty unwisely, people could take themselves or their capital else-
where.93 Thus, while the federal government was restrained by
its constitutionally enumerated powers, the states -were re-
strained by competition.
Historic federalism was remarkably successful in restraining
the production of private interest goods.94 In the nineteenth cen-
tury, when the states rather than the federal government were
responsible for general economic and social regulation, the states
did not enact large entitlement programs.95 Medicare and Social
Security, in their current form as vast intergenerational trans-
fers, would not have been possible then because no state could
have afforded to impose high payroll taxes on its productive
workers and businesses; they would have moved elsewhere to
avoid payment.
Bicameralism is a second constitutional mechanism that
makes it harder for special interests to obtain private interest
spending. Intuitively, the manner in which bicameralism
achieves this objective is clear: those seeking private interest
the spending conditions imposed on the state. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Fed.
eral Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUIM. L. REV. 1911, 1916 (1995) (distinguishing be-
tween regulatory conditions and reimbursement conditions imposed by Congress pur-
suant to its spending power).
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people.").
91. Many of the prohibitions on the states also were designed to prevent them
from interfering with vibrant trade. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 10, el. 1 (preventing states
from coining money or making paper money).
92. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (offering an economic analysis of this tendency of federalism).
93. See Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of
the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 561 (1994) (collecting em-
pirical evidence of migration from state to state in response to legal changes).
94. See Weingast, supra note 23, at 25.
95. See id. at 9.
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spending have to obtain a majority in not one but two legislative
bodies.96 At least where representatives are elected from dis-
tricts that are not coextensive, bicameralism raises the effective
majority necessary to pass legislation."
The third mechanism for restraining rent-seeking-the sepa-
ration of powers-performs this function in several ways. The
presidential veto limits rent-seeking in the same way that
bicameralism does-proponents of legislation must secure the
support not merely of both houses of Congress, but also of the
President, who is elected by a different constituency than either
house.9" The existence of three branches also makes it hard for a
current majority to control the entire apparatus of the federal
government at one time. One source of constraint is the different
methods used to select the officeholders of each branch and the
different timing of their appointments. For instance, the judiciary
of any given era largely represents the choices of past presidents
and therefore reflects past majorities more than current ones.99
Another source of constraint is the difference in the functions
exercised by the branches. For example, recognizing that the
President has the preeminent responsibility for military mat-
ters, 100 the voters who elect him may choose members of Con-
gress with views on domestic matters different from those held
by the President. This may lead to a divided government in
which the governing coalition possesses less power.' 01
96. See Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 56, 72-73 (1987).
97. See MUELLER, supra note 35, at 195.
98. See Macey, supra note 96, at 76.
99. See Richard E. Morgan, Comment, 47 MD. L. REV. 139, 143 (1987) (comment-
ing on Archibald Cox's article, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or
Self-restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 118 (1987), and contending that judicial review per-
mits past majorities to exercise continuing influence).
100. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 295 (1996) (asserting that the
constitution is structured to give the President the initiative in military affairs).
101. Given these differences in function, the branches themselves acquire different
institutional interests even when controlled by similar majorities, thus ensuring a
perpetual struggle in a kind of state of nature at the heart of Leviathan-a struggle
that also impedes a regime of permanent or tyrannical majoritarian control. See
John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and
War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW
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The fourth mechanism for restraining the production of pri-
vate interest goods is the establishment of a large national re-
public. In the famous theory of Federalist No. 10, Madison ar-
gued that a large republic would contain a sufficient number of
factions so that no single faction could use the government to
oppress the others." 2 Democracy on a large scale constrains the
power of majorities more than democracy on a small scale be-
cause the insecure and shifting ground of ever-changing and
multiple coalitions tends to frustrate any long term scheme in
favor of producing private interest goods for the current majori-
ty.10 3 Significantly, however, the Framers designed this last
mechanism more to restrain the power of the majority than the
power of special interest groups.' 0 '
Many of these mechanisms also achieved the second objective
of constitutionalism-facilitating the production of public inter-
est goods. For instance, by giving governmental powers to small-
er units with diverse populations, federalism makes it easier to
create the public goods that will satisfy the distinctive preferenc-
es of different populations.' Because the spirit of human benev-
olence is more likely to be expressed at shorter distances,0 6 fed-
eralism creates communities in which bonds of common acquain-
tance and local tradition provide a larger scope for the expres-
sion of fellow feeling. Such sentiments make it easier to reach
decisions regarding appropriate public interest goods.
Bicameralism l0 7 and the presidential veto power 10 8 also tend to
focus citizens more on the common good. By making it harder
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 303 (1993).
102. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62-65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
103. For further discussion of the importance of an extended democratic sphere in
limiting the endurance of any single majority faction's control, see DAVID F. EPSTEIN,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 99-107 (1984).
104. Although Federalist No. 10 began by addressing the problem of factions gener-
ally, it went on to advocate the creation of a national republic as a specific means
to restrain a faction that constitutes a majority. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison).
105. See .Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (book review) (arguing that the structure of feder-
alism provides a better set of public goods).
106. See id. at 1510.
107. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1.
108. See id. art. I, § 7.
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for special interests to work their will, these two constitutional
procedures screen out many divisive proposals from serious con-
sideration. To be successful, politicians must promote an agenda
that attracts a more substantial consensus. Civic action there-
fore comes to focus on what unites the polity rather than what
divides it, generating a spirit more favorable to the creation of
public interest goods than to the acquisition of private interest
goods. 0 9
Because we view supermajority rules as a replacement for
some of the mechanisms in the original Constitution, we will in-
quire into the capacity of supermajority rules both to restrain
the production of private interest goods and to promote the sen-
timents that underpin public interest goods.
C. The Rise of the Special Interest State
The Constitution of today does not restrain the production of
private interest goods by the government as successfully as did
the original Constitution. The causes of the dissolution of the
restraints are endogenous and exogenous-deriving from within
and without the system of constitutional law. First, many of
these constitutional restraints, from federalism to the separation
of powers, have been weakened or eviscerated through amend-
ment and judicial abnegation. Second, various changes in cul-
ture and technology, such as a rise in the division of labor, have
made it easier for interest groups to form in order to acquire
private interest goods from the government. The result has been
the simultaneous establishment of a powerful centralized state
liable to exploitation by special interests and the emergence of a
multitude of special interests with an enlarged capacity to ex-
ploit that state.
1. The Dissolution of Constitutional Restraints
The Constitution's centralization of power in the federal gov-
ernment had its genesis in the Progressive Era." In 1913, the
109. For further discussion of the manner in which our constitutional system is
constitutive of political discourse, see infra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
110. Although some might contend that the centralization of power began with the
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nation enacted both the Sixteenth Amendment, which permitted
federal taxes on income,"' and the Seventeenth Amendment,
which mandated the direct election of senators.1 2 After their
passage, the percentage of national wealth spent by the federal
government on domestic expenditures immediately began to
rise."3 Even more .importantly, these amendments set the stage
for the collapse of federalism and the expansion of the federal
government's powers.
The Sixteenth Amendment removed the original Constitu-
tion's careful limitations on the federal government's taxing
power by permitting unrestricted taxes on income.114 With great-
er resources at its disposal, the federal government became more
of a target for interest groups that wanted to use the govern-
ment to secure private interest goods."' 5
At the same time, the Seventeenth Amendment weakened the
restraints on the federal government's production of private in-
terest goods in two ways. First, because senators became inde-
pendent of state legislatures, they no longer had an incentive to
protect state sovereignty." 6 To the contrary, after adoption of
the amendment, senators possessed a natural inclination to en-
croach on state sovereignty; after all, states were a competing
power center for servicing constituents and interest groups. As a
result, the protection of the enumerated powers on which feder-
alism depended lost a crucial institutional defense within the
enactment of the Civil War Amendments, we argue that the original purposes of
these amendments were consonant with the limited government established by the
Framers' Constitution. See PHILLIP BOBBIT, CONsTITUTIONAL FATE 147 (1982) (sug-
gesting that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to require the states to main-
tain a limited government based on the model of the federal government).
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
112. See id. amend. XVII.
113. Federal domestic spending increased from less than 1% of GNP in 1913 to
4.4% in 1920. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 224, 1114 (providing data
for the preceding calculations).
114. For a discussion of these restrictions on the government's taxing power under
the original Constitution, see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
115. See Engdahl, supra note 79, at 33.
116. See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism and the Sirens'
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 557 (1997) (noting
that the Seventeenth Amendment greatly increased the independence of senators
from state legislatures).
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federal government."1 Second, because state legislators were
superior to the general public at monitoring the behavior of sen-
ators, the amendment increased monitoring costs, making it eas-
ier for senators to prefer special interests to the interests of
their constituents."' The increase in average tenure in the Sen-
ate that followed the amendment also made it easier for interest
groups to strike long term deals and made redistributive legisla-
tion more valuable." 9
As the federal government acquired greater resources and cast
off many institutional restraints, interest groups found them-
selves in a better position to obtain the passage of new federal
spending initiatives. 2 ' The only remaining limitation on such
programs was the willingness of the Supreme Court to prevent
Congress from exceeding the enumerated powers outlined in the
Constitution. 12' Although the Court initially resisted some of the
new programs and assertions of powers, 22 it came under politi-
cal attack for doing so. 2 3 By the early 1940s, it had relented
117. See Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and the
Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
189, 198-99 (1987) (discussing the Seventeenth Amendment's crippling effect on state
self-defense).
118. Ree Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis
of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1041-42 (1994).
119. See David N. Laband, Transactions Costs and Production in a Legislative Set-
ting, 57 PUB. CHOICE 183 (1988) (observing that longer tenure may assist legislators
in getting their bills passed more rapidly); Zywicki, supra note 118, at 1048-52.
120. See David E. Kyvig, Refining or Resisting Modern Government? The Balanced
Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 28 AKRON L. REV. 97, 101 (1995) (not-
ing that the huge increase in federal government spending began with the New
Deal).
121. For a discussion of these restrictions, see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text.
122. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
123. The view that the Supreme Court in the New Deal abandoned its previous
constitutional doctrine because of immediate political pressure is the traditional one.
See, e.g., WiLLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 236 (1995). Recent-
ly, however, in an important revisionist account, Barry Cushman has persuasively
argued that the swing voters on the Court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and
Justice Owen Roberts chosen by the progressive Republican President Herbert Hoo-
ver, were motivated in their decisions by their own progressive Republican views.
See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3 (1998). This new version of the New Deal Court's
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and essentially eliminated any federalism restrictions on nation-
al power. First, the Court expanded the scope of the Commerce
Clause, which conferred enormous power on the federal govern-
ment to regulate and to spend funds.'24 Second, the Court aban-
doned its effort to limit Congress's spending power, essentially
giving the federal government plenary spending authority.
125
Without effective limitations on the spending power of the
federal government, constitutional federalism-the keystone of
the structure that restrained private interest spending-all but
disappeared.126 To be sure, some restraints on private interest
spending have remained, such as the large republic and
bicameralism. But the large republic was designed mainly to
restrain the majority from providing private interest goods to
itself.127 It therefore is unsurprising that the size of the republic
has failed to prevent the huge growth in spending on behalf of
numerically smaller interests. The strongest remaining limita-
tion, bicameralism, is nonetheless a fairly modest restraint on
special interests. It alone cannot be expected to do the work of
the Constitution's original limiting mechanisms.
One important lesson of this constitutional transformation
over the last 200 years is that absolute constitutional limitations
on national majoritarianism have not been able to withstand the
dynamics does not detract from our basic point: over the long run, absolute limita-
tions are not able to endure in defiance of popular will, whether that will is the
result of short-term changes in partisan politics or longer-term changes in commonly
held political ideals.
124. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REv. 1387, 1443-50 (1987) (discussing the vast expansion of the Commerce Clause
during the New Deal).
125. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 573-95 (1937).
126. Recent years have witnessed a much discussed revival of federalism. Even in
the areas of the Commerce Clause and state sovereignty, however, constitutional fed-
eralism has been expanded at the margins and does not yet represent an effective
check on spending. The federal government continues to enjoy almost plenary taxing
and spending powers. See Baker, supra note 89, at 1937 n.134. For a discussion of
the so-called "revival" of federalism and the reasons why it is unlikely to be restored
to anything approaching its former importance, see John 0. McGinnis, Disciplining
Congress: The Boundaries of Legislative Power, 13 J.L. & POL. 588 (1997) (panel
discussion).
127. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Pub-
lic Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1337 (1994).
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test of time. Whatever the form of such absolute limitations, the
Court often has not been willing to defend them against popular
pressure. By contrast, qualified restrictions on national
majoritarianism have fared better. Bicameralism and the presi-
dential veto, which limit the power of simple majorities but do
not prevent the enactment of legislation with a substantial con-
sensus, have survived.'28 This history supports the argument
advanced below that the qualified nature of fiscal supermajority
rules is an important virtue of their structure.
2. Exogenous Change and the Red Queen Problem of
Constitutionalism
These significant changes in the structure of the Constitution
are not, however, the only reason for the rise of the special in-
terest state. Changes in technology and modes of production
that are exogenous to the Constitution also have strengthened
interest groups.
First, economic development has extended the division and
specialization of labor."9 When the country was formed, the poli-
ty was divided largely between farmers and merchants, but now
it consists of corporate executives, clerical workers, laborers,
government bureaucrats, academics, and journalists, to name
just a few of the more salient classifications. 3 ° As the number of
occupations with distinct interests increases, the number of in-
terest groups that have an incentive to lobby for subsidies from
the government grows.'1
3
Second, the declining costs of information transmission also
have increased the ability of interest groups to extract subsidies
from the government. 132 Costs of information transmission have
128. To be sure, these constitutional restrictions have been tempered in the regula-
tory area by the decline of the nondelegation doctrine, which has allowed Congress
to vest substantial legal authority in administrative agencies whose rules are not
subject to bicameralism. See Aranson et al., supra note 31, at 63.
129. See Douglas C. North & John Joseph Wallis, American Government Expendi-
tures: A Historical Perspective, 72 Am. EcON. RaV. 336, 338-40 (1982).
130. See id
131. See id.
132. See Peter H. Schuck, Against (and For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Fac-
tions, 15 YALE L. & POLY REV. 553, 580 (1997).
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decreased due to the revolution in both computers and
communications. 33 As a result of these changes, interest groups
are more effective because they are better able to organize, to
keep track of changes in their benefits, and to monitor the be-
havior of members of Congress.'3 '
Third, government bureaucracies, which have grown tremen-
dously over the past several decades, have become a powerful
special interest group.3 5 Whatever their particular objectives,
government bureaucrats generally have an incentive to support
larger bureaus and enhanced government powers. 36 Moreover,
once government programs are established, they provide an im-
petus for interest groups, such as the elderly, to organize. 3 7
Taken together, the technological and cultural changes that fa-
cilitate private interest spending strengthen the argument that
new constitutional barriers against such spending are impera-
tive if we are to restore the Framers' vision of limited govern-
ment.
One particularly important explanation of the increasing pow-
er of special interests should help overcome our natural reluc-
tance to amend the Constitution, whether from veneration of the
Framers' work or respect for tradition. Mancur Olson has shown
that relatively stable societies like ours inevitably accumulate
special interest organizations. 3 ' Olson maintains that it general-
ly is difficult for individuals to circumvent free riding problems
and to organize groups that can influence governmental
decisionmaking 3  Nevertheless, over time, favorable circum-
stances sometimes arise that permit an inchoate group to over-
come free riding through a variety of means, including the cre-
ation of organizations that can effectively restrict rewards from
133. See id; David Marsh, Internet Can't Replace Face-to-Face Chats, PALM BEACH
POST, Nov. 30, 1997, at 12D, available in LEXIS, News Library, Pbpst File.
134. See Easterbrook, supra note 127, at 1334-35; Schuck, supra note 132, at 580-
83.
135. See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617,
624-26 (1975).
136. See id, at 618-33.
137. For further discussion of this principle, see supra notes 40-45 and accompany-
ing text.
138. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 39-41 (1982).
139. See id.
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government influence to its members. 40 Once such organizations
are created, they have staying power, and thus the number of
special interest groups will grow over time until a social upheav-
al cleanses society of their negative impact.'
Olson's theory suggests that a successful constitution must
periodically update its restraints on interest groups to remain
successful, because its very success in generating political order
will breed interest groups and thereby create pressure to evis-
cerate its restraints. 142 As the "Red Queen" in Through the Look-
ing Glass must run to remain in place,' so must a constitution
change over time if it is to continue to promote the public inter-
est rather than private interests. Paradoxically, constitutional
inertia can be a recipe for the radical transformation of society.
D. The Operation of the Special Interest State
With the leveling of the restraints that the Framers placed on
government, the years since the New Deal have seen the rise of
the special interest state. This era has been open season for in-
terest groups seeking to use the government to acquire resourc-
es. The resulting transformation has had four lasting conse-
quences that are relevant to our argument for fiscal
supermajority rules.
First, since the passage of the amendments permitting income
taxation and mandating the direct elections of senators began
the movement to a powerful centralized state,TM the percentage
of the gross national product devoted to domestic spending has
increased steadily. 4 ' Second, an increasing percentage of budget
140. See id. at 40.
141. See id& at 69-74.
142. See id&
143. See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKiNG-GLASs 43 (miniature ed. 1924)
(1871).
144. See supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
145. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 390; HISTORICAL
STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 224, 1114. The following matrix summarizes this rise in
spending:
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outlays now constitute transfer payments to individuals rather
than finding for public interest goods.'46 Most of these transfers
should be understood as private interest spending because they
are directed not only to the poor, but also to the middle class
and the wealthy.
14 7
Third, some powerful interest groups like the elderly have
succeeded in structuring their programs as entitlements. The
result is that they are insulated from reconsideration in the an-
nual budget process.'48 Such entitlements are so entrenched that
statutory attempts to establish structural limitations to budget
deficits-such as the Gramm-Rudman Act-have been forced
largely to exempt entitlements from their strictures." 9 As a re-
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC FEDERAL
SPENDING AS A SPENDING AS A
YEAR PERCENTAGE OF GNP PERCENTAGE OF GNP
1910 2.0 1.0
1920 6.9 4.4
1930 3.7 2.7
1940 9.7 8.0
1950 15.6 10.6
1960 17.8 8.5
1970 19.4 11.3
1980 21.7 16.8
1990 22.0 14.7
1995 21.4 17.3
146. The latest GAO report lays out this trend:
During the last 25 years, changes in outlay patterns have also document-
ed shifts in the mission priorities of the federal government. For exam-
ple, as a share of total spending, only outlays for human services and
interest payments grew during this period; outlays for defense, economic
affairs, natural resources, and central government operations all declined
as shares of overall spending. Also, outlay patterns disclose a change in
federal government activity from principally providing goods or services
(directly or via contract) to principally providing payments to individuals.
PAUL L. POSNER, FIScAL TRENDs-FISCAL YEARS 1971-1995 (GAO Rep. AIMD-97-3,
1996).
147. See PETER G. PETERSON, FACING UP 96-104, 118-20 (1993).
148. Even so-called "cost of living increases" that in reality are more generous than
necessary to keep up with inflation are allowed automatically each year. See State-
ment by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, B& of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Be-
fore the Comm. on the Budget, U.S. Senate, Jan. 21, 1997, reprinted in 83 FED. RE-
SERVE BuLL. 195, 197 (1997) (noting several studies that suggested that the Con-
sumer Price Index on which cost of living increases were based overstates inflation).
149. See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-
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sult, the growth in spending proceeds on automatic pilot, creat-
ing a sclerotic politics that is unable to respond to new social
problems.
Fourth, the decrease in restraints on special interests has re-
sulted in excessive debt.' Politicians often finance spending
programs with debt, rather than taxes, because this shifts the
costs onto future generations and reduces the political opposition
to special interest spending.'5 ' This debt in turn has its own dis-
tinctively bad effects on economic growth. It raises interest rates
and crowds out private investment. 5 2 It also encourages in-
creased current consumption at the expense of saving. 5 3 Apart
from these economic effects, it also raises serious questions of
intergenerational equity.
54
These characteristics of the special interest state have led to a
widespread, if inchoate, sense across the ideological spectrum
that constitutional amendments are necessary to address the
private interest spending spurred by the growth in power of spe-
cial interests. Proponents of campaign finance reform attempt to
restrain special interests by limiting campaign contributions.'
Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REv. 593, 657 (1988).
150. After 28 years of federal deficits, the United States enjoyed a small budget
surplus for the year 1998 of approximately $63 billion in a budget of $1.7 trillion.
See George Hager, End of Deficit Era Marks Beginning of Battle over Surpluses,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1998, at C10. Government spending eventually will balloon,
however, because of government transfers to baby boomers. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 3-4. Debt therefore may mount again unless Congress imposes politically
unpalatable tax increases.
151. See Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That
Does What It Is Supposed to Do (And No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1462 (1997)
(stating that debt allows more spending than tax revenue alone because the inci-
dence may fall on unrepresented individuals); see also SHAVIRO, supra note 71, at
222 (rejecting the hypothesis that the method of funding government does not effect
the level of spending).
152. See S. REP. No. 104-5, at 7 (1995) ("By consuming such an overwhelming part of
the capital in the economy, the Government 'crowds out' private sector investment.
Thus, when government spending rises unchecked by fiscal responsibility, it chokes
off the primary engines of economic growth and risks our long-term security.").
153. See SHAVIRO, supra note 71, at 203-05.
154. See E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 1077, 1091-92 (arguing that a major factor in deficit spending is the ability of
legislators to shift the cost of today's programs to the politically unrepresented gen-
erations of tomorrow).
155. This is the left of center solution offered by Democrats in Congress. See The
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Proponents of term limits try to solve the problem by curtailing
the power of long-term politicians who are likely to be beholden
to special interests.'56 Supporters of the Balanced Budget
Amendment attempt to constrain the power of special interests
by making it more difficult to pay for their programs through
debt.5 ' Whatever the merits of these proposals, we believe that
the best way of addressing the problem of the special interest
state is by attempting to curtail directly and comprehensively
the primary evil-excessive spending on special interests. It is to
the theory and operation of such rules that we now turn.
II. SUPERMAJORITY RULES AS A THIRD DECISIONMAKING RULE
Many constitutions, including the United States Constitution,
employ two basic mechanisms to govern which laws may be en-
acted. In most cases, the legislature decides which bills to pass
under a system of majority rule. Rule by legislative majority has
many virtues, but in certain areas-as discussed previously-it
produces undesirable results. 5 s As a result, the Constitution em-
ploys a second method to determine which laws may be enacted.
Under this method, laws may be enforced only if they do not
violate certain absolute constitutional limitations on legislative
power. Administered principally by the courts, these limitations
may take the form of either individual rights or restrictions on
the power of the federal government.'5 9
President and Congress, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at C6. For a fuller discussion,
see infra notes 383-405 and accompanying text.
156. See Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 83,
118-19, 180-85 (1997). This is the centrist solution supported by a variety of groups,
including former independent presidential candidate Ross Perot. See Elizabeth
Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 623, 629 n.13 (1996).
157. See Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting' the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1019, 1026 n.38 (1992). This is the right of center solution offered by Re-
publicans in Congress. See The President and Congress, supra note 155, at C6.
158. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
159. The Constitution also employs absolute restrictions on the power of state gov-
ernments. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The intent of this Article, however, is
to impose additional limitations on the federal government, and it therefore focuses
on federal restrictions.
1999] 399
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
This two-part constitutional regime is best understood as a
means of promoting the public interest. When the legislature is
more likely than the courts to make a decision in the public in-
terest, the Constitution employs rule by legislative majority.
When the legislature cannot be trusted to legislate well, and
when the courts can be relied upon to enforce a constitutional
provision, the Constitution uses absolute limitations. Under this
system, a well-structured constitution employs an institution-
either the legislature or the courts-only when it will perform
better than the alternative institution.
160
Although this matching of decisioniaking rules with the type
of decision to be made improves the operation of our political
system, the system is relatively crude in that it relies largely on
only two decisionmaking rules.161 It is our thesis that superma-
jority rules are a third type of decisionmaking rule and that, for
certain kinds of decisions, supermajority rules are superior to
both absolute limitations and rule by legislative majority. In
particular, we believe that supermajority rules are a superior
decisionmaking tool regarding various fiscal decisions. Such
rules would allow government to act more in the public interest
and less at the behest of private interests.
Supermajority rules combine features of both majority rules
and absolute limitations to create a distinctive decisionmaking
160. This constitutional regime can be analogized to a basic result in transactions
costs economics. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM 68-84 (1985) (discussing transactions costs theory). In transactions
costs economics, transactions are structured by choosing a governance structure, such
as a particular contractual or organizational form, that is appropriate to the type of
transaction to be conducted. See id Some governance structures will be appropriate
for certain types of transactions, while other governance structures will be appropri-
ate for other types of transactions. See id Similarly, the superior political gover-
nance structure-whether rule by legislative majority or an absolute constitutional
limitation-will depend on the type of decision that the government is required to
make.
161. The Constitution does employ explicit supermajority rules in certain limited
circumstances. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (requiring two-thirds of the
Senate to convict for impeachment); id- art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring two-thirds of the
Senate to concur on treaties); ici art. V (requiring various supermajority schemes to
amend the Constitution). See also supra text accompanying notes 96-97 (arguing that
majority rule under a bicameral legislature can be understood as a type of
supermajority rule).
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rule. Supermajority rules resemble rule by legislative majority
in that they permit the legislature to enact certain forms of leg-
islation with limited review by the courts.'62 Supermajority rules
also resemble absolute limitations because they restrict the abil-
ity of the legislature to pass laws in certain areas. This restric-
tion, however, is not imposed principally by the courts, but by
requiring an additional number of legislators to pass a bill.'63
Given these characteristics, supermajority rules may function
better than either rule by legislative majority or absolute limita-
tions in areas in which the legislature should be constrained,
but in which courts cannot be trusted to enforce an absolute lim-
itation.64
This section of the Article illustrates the utility of
supermajority rules by developing the argument that, for fiscal
legislation, supermajority rules are superior to rule by legisla-
tive majority and absolute limitations. First, the section com-
pares supermajority rules to rule. by legislative majority. It
shows that rule by legislative majority functions poorly as to
spending decisions because special interests can influence the
162. We discuss the duties of courts under supermajority rules below. See infra
notes 275-78, 286-87 and accompanying text.
163. For a more precise formulation of the division of labor between courts and
legislatures in supermajority rules, see infra notes 275-78, 286-87 and accompanying
text.
164. Supermajority rules have been a subject of much discussion in legal literature.
See MUELLER, supra note 35, at 153-57, 209-11, 254; Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H.
Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 56-
62 (1997); Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?,
12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 155-59 (1992). See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 63-84 (1962) (providing a classic
treatment of supermajority rules).
The constitutionality of legislative rules that adopt supermajority requirements
have also been the subject of scholarly discussion. See Bruce Ackerman et al., An
Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539, 1559-43 (1995); John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense 105 YALE L.J. 483, 483-85 (1995) [hereinafter McGinnis &
Rappaport, Constitutionality]; John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights
of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitu-
tionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327, 327-30 (1997); Jed
Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 73-74
(1996); see also Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 181, 239-52 (1997) (discussing supermajoritarian features of the filibuster).
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legislature to secure private interest spending programs. It then
shows that a supermajority rule that constrains spending deci-
sions would help to reduce the power of special interests.
After concluding that supermajority rules are superior to rule
by legislative majority regarding spending decisions, superma-
jority rules then are compared to absolute limitations. Although
absolute limitations function better than supermajority rules in
protecting certain individual rights, we contend that superma-
jority rules are superior in the context of spending decisions. 65
Supermajority rules would constrain the legislature without re-
quiring the judiciary to undertake functions for which it is ill-
suited.
A. Supermajority Rules Function Better Than Majority Rule as
to Fiscal Legislation
1. The Circumstances When Rule by Legislative Majority and
Supermajority Rules Function Well
This section explores the different circumstances in which rule
by legislative majority and supermajority rules function well. As
argued below, majority rule performs better when legislators
and citizens have relatively equal influence on the passage of
legislation. When some citizens have disproportionate influence
on legislation, however, supermajority rules may perform better
than majority rule.
Majority rule is the voting rule most often associated with
democracy.166 Majority voting rules generally are employed in
the legislative assembly and in popular elections. Perhaps the
most important normative argument for majority rule is that it
reflects the principle that all citizens are equal.'67 This point is
captured in the statement "one person, one vote."
165. Supermajority rules are particularly useful in restraining spending decisions,
but they also may improve other areas of governance if those areas meet the criteria
proposed by this Article.
166. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 24 (1957) (defin-
ing democracy in terms of majority rule); Baker & Dinkin, supra note 164, at 57
(arguing that majority rule occupies a central place in democratic theory).
167. See SuSAN ROSE-AcKERMAN, RETi-iNn NG THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 47-48
(1992).
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Majority voting functions well when the equality of citizenship
principle is reflected in reality. It is not enough that all citizens
and representatives should have one vote.168 It also is necessary
that each citizen has a relatively equal influence on his rep-
resentative and each representative has a relatively equal in-
fluence on legislation.'69 Under these conditions, legislative de-
cisions should actually reflect the desires of a majority of the
public.1
70
By contrast, if some citizens are able to influence the political
process more than others, their interests may prevail even
though only a minority of citizens supports their position. We
have argued that under modern conditions, special interest
groups have disproportionate power to influence the political
process and to secure additional benefits for themselves. 171 As a
result, majority rule functions poorly.
In these circumstances, supermajority rules may function bet-
ter than majority rule. While special interests' may be able to
secure private goods for themselves under, majority rule,
supermajority rules may operate to constrain such undesirable
legislation. A supermajority rule will require a greater percent-
age of legislators to support a bill. This will increase the costs
168. It is important to emphasize that the argument for majority voting in a legis-
lative assembly based on the one person, one vote theory does not derive its force
from the inherent equality of legislators. Rather, it is based on the view that each
legislator represents an equal number of citizens who express their votes through
their representative. See MUELLER, supra note 35, at 102.
169. If some citizens or representatives have disproportionate influence, this is func-
tionally equivalent to allowing some citizens or representatives more votes than
others.
170. Many other circumstances, of course, will affect the performance of majority
rule. One such factor is the intensity of preferences of different voters. Some argue
that majority rule will function well when the preferences of voters are of equal in-
tensity. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 164, at 126. This condition is satis-
fied when the benefits to be gained by each citizen who benefits from legislation are
roughly equal to the costs that are borne by each citizen who is harmed by the leg-
islation. See iL If thii condition is violated because the benefits to each citizen in
the majority are small compared to the costs to each citizen in the minority, then
legislation might pass, even though the total benefits are smaller than the total
costs. See id at 126-27. Because the violation of this condition is not an important
cause of Congress's poor performance in the fiscal area, this Article focuses instead
on the equal influence condition discussed in the text.
171. See supra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
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special interests bear in securing private interest legislation,
which should reduce the amount of such legislation that is en-
acted.
A supermajority rule also will impede the passage of public in-
terest legislation by requiring it to obtain more legislative sup-
port. To determine whether a supermajority rule is beneficial,
one therefore must look at both the desirable and undesirable
legislation that it prevents from being enacted. A supermajority
rule will be beneficial only if the benefits it produces by blocking
undesirable legislation outweigh the harm it imposes by block-
ing desirable legislation. Supermajority rules therefore will work
best where majority rule tends to produce a large percentage of
harmful legislation. In these instances, supermajority rules are
more likely to prevent the passage of more harmful legislation
than beneficial legislation.
The effects of supermajority rules are not limited to merely
preventing the passage of certain legislation. Supermajority
rules also increase holdout costs. Holdouts occur when legisla-
tors who would otherwise support a bill refuse to do so in order
to extract additional benefits." 2 Holdout costs include the pri-
vate interest provisions that must be inserted to secure the sup-
port of holdouts as well as the time necessary to negotiate an
agreement with the holdouts.
Under supermajority rules, holdouts have more leverage be-
cause there are fewer other legislators with whom the majority
can bargain to form a supermajority coalition.' For example,
under majority rule, if forty-nine senators support a bill, then a
single holdout will have relatively little leverage, because the
proponents of the bill can attempt to secure the additional vote
from any one of the other fifty senators. By contrast, under a
172. See MUELLER, supra note 30, at 50-52 (discussing incentives to engage in stra-
tegic behavior under unanimity rules); POSNER, supra note 37, at 65, 67, 416 (dis-
cussing holdouts in other contexts).
173. Supermajority rules also increase the decisionmaking costs of passing legisla-
tion. Decisionmaking costs are the costs of securing the support of the requisite
number of legislators to pass a bill through negotiation and persuasion. See BU-
CHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 164, at 68. These costs increase as the number of
legislators required to pass a bill increases, because it takes more time and more ef-
fort to secure an agreement between a larger number of parties. See id
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three-fifths supermajority rule, if fifty-nine senators support a
bill, a single holdout will have more leverage, because the propo-
nents must now secure the additional vote from one of the re-
maining forty senators. Although supermajority rules therefore
increase holdout costs, the moderate supermajority rules of
three-fifths or two-thirds that this Article advocates are unlikely
to increase holdout costs significantly because a large group of
legislators remains available as a potential source of additional
votes. It is only when the percentage of legislators required to
pass a bill approaches extremely high levels, such as over ninety
percent, that a small number of legislators has significant lever-
age or monopoly power. Still, holdout costs are one factor to con-
sider when evaluating all supermajority rules."'
2. Spending Supermajority Rules
As special interest groups can secure financial benefits for
themselves-at the expense of the public, it makes sense to con-
strain their activities through a fiscal supermajority rule. We
therefore propose such a rule as a practical example of how
supermajority rules can improve government decisionmaking.
Our discussion of this specific topic, however, also will illumi-
nate general issues in the theory of supermajority rules.
Although supermajority rules for debt and for taxes have been
proposed, we believe that the best fiscal supermajority rule
would apply to government spending. There are two basic rea-
sons why a spending supermajority rule would perform better
than other rules. First, a spending supermajority rule provides a
comprehensive method of limiting the financial costs of govern-
ment. These costs are primarily the costs of funding government
programs through taxes, debt, or the printing of money.7 5 Many
proposed supermajority rules do not limit these costs compre-
hensively and thereby run the risk that Congress will evade
174. This Article adopts a two-part supermajority rule in part because it reduces
holdout costs for appropriation laws. Holdout costs are particularly high as to such
laws because failure to enact them may force the government to shut down. See in-
fra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
175. See James Buchanan, Taxes, Money, and Public Debt, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 1044-45 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
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their restrictions. For example, because a Balanced Budget
Amendment restrains only debt, it does not prevent Congress
from raising taxes or printing money. A spending supermajority
rule, by contrast, imposes a more global restraint on the costs of
government. Because government only taxes, borrows, or prints
money to finance spending, a reduction of government spending
also will reduce the need to finance such spending.
Second, spending supermajority rules are also simpler to im-
plement than other supermajority rules. The financial costs of
government could be comprehensively constrained by a super-
majority rule that applies to taxes, debt, and the printing of
money, but it is far more complicated to apply a supermajority
to three variables than to one. Moreover, a spending superma-
jority rule also would be simpler to implement than less compre-
hensive supermajority rules, such as the Balanced Budget
Amendment.
11 6
There are various spending supermajority rules that could be
imposed. In our view, the optimal rule would require superma-
jorities in two situations. First, the rule would require that Con-
gress secure a supermajority to authorize total government
spending that is greater than some large percentage of the total
amount spent in the previous year. We select ninety percent as
the appropriate percentage." 7 Second, the rule would require a
supermajority to create or expand entitlement programs. Of
course, simpler spending supermajority rules than this two-part
rule do exist. Perhaps the simplest rule would require a
supermajority to pass all spending bills. This rule, however,
would be subject to significant holdout problems, which the two-
part rule would avoid.178 Moreover, a supermajority rule for all
spending bills would restrain entitlement spending and ordinary
176. As discussed below, it is easier to define the meaning of spending than that of
debt. See infra notes 330-32 and accompanying text. In addition, while a Balanced
Budget Amendment would often require precise determinations of how much debt
had been issued, spending supermajority rules generally would avoid the need to
determine exactly how much spending had occurred. See infra notes 333-40 and ac-
companying text.
177. See infra note 236 (explaining considerations that determine the appropriate
percentage).
178. See infra notes 223-33 and accompanying text.
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appropriations equally. This would be a mistake, because enti-
tlement spending has lower holdout costs in its enactment pro-
cess and yet is harder to control once enacted. 171 Therefore, enti-
tlement spending requires a more stringent restraint.
3. A Supermajority Rule for All Spending Bills
The argument for the two-part spending supermajority rule
can be understood most easily if it is presented in two stages.
The first stage explores a supermajority rule for all spending
bills. After discussing the advantages and disadvantages of that
rule, we then will be in a position to describe the arguments for
the two-part rule described above.
a. Impeding Private Interest Spending
This section argues that in the absence of holdout costs, a
supermajority rule for all spending bills would improve the con-
tent of federal spending by preventing the passage of some pri-
vate interest spending bills. Supermajority rules, however, will
not merely prevent the passage of private interest spending
bills, but also of public interest spending bills. Thus, to deter-
mine the net effect of the supermajority rule, one must compare
the benefits it produces by blocking private interest spending
with the costs it imposes by preventing the passage of public in-
terest spending. Supermajority rules will be beneficial only if the
benefits outweigh the costs.
In determining whether a spending supermajority rule is like-
ly to be beneficial, it is useful to employ the theory of economic
efficiency, because it permits a weighing of the benefits and
costs of the legislation that the supermajority rule will block.i 0
The language of the theory also permits a precise expression of
many of the issues involved.'
179. See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
180. For a definition of economic efficiency, see supra note 26.
181. Although this Article uses the value of efficiency to argue that supermajority
rules on balance will be more desirable than spending bills, it does not rely entirely
on efficiency as the normative basis of its argument. Thus, after making the argu-
ment based on efficiency, the Article reaches the same conclusion using other norma-
tive standards. See infra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
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Under the theory of economic efficiency, the efficiency of a
supermajority rule will turn on the efficiency of the spending
that majority rule would allow but the supermajority rule would
prevent. If the spending that is blocked by a supermajority rule
produces net benefits-that is, if its total benefits exceed its to-
tal costs-then a supermajority rule will be inefficient. If this
spending produces net costs-that is, if its total costs exceed its
total benefits-then a supermajority rule will be efficient. Thus,
the key issue is whether spending blocked by the supermajority
rule will produce net benefits or net costs.
The efficiency of the spending that is blocked by a
supermajority rule will turn on at least two factors. 82 First, it
will depend on how inefficient is total federal spending under
majority rule. The spending that a supermajority rule blocks is a
subset of the total spending that would be passed under majori-
ty rule. Thus, the more inefficient that total federal spending
under majority rule is, the more likely that the spending blocked
by the supermajority rule will produce net costs.
Second, the efficiency of the spending blocked by a
supermajority rule also will depend on the extent to which in-
creasing the percentage of legislators required to pass legislation
will improve the efficiency of spending legislation. We argue that
as the percentage of legislators required to pass a bill increases,
the percentage of efficient spending bills that are enacted also
should increase. Thus, one would expect there to be a higher
percentage of efficient spending from bills supported by more
182. The most direct way to determine whether or not a supermajority rule blocks
spending that produces net costs would be to observe the number of votes that dif-
ferent pieces of legislation receive. Unfortunately, the number of votes received by
legislation under majority rule is not a good indicator of whether legislation could
have passed under a supermajority rule. First, simply because legislation receives
more than 60% of the votes does not necessarily mean it would have received the
same number of votes under a supermajority rule. Many legislators may vote for
legislation once they know it will pass, even though they would have voted against
it had their vote made a difference. Similarly, legislation that receives only 51% of
the votes might have received more votes under a supermajority rule because these
votes would have been necessary to pass the legislation. Second, different legislation
may be proposed under majority rule as opposed to supermajority rule. For example,
certain legislation that is not controversial and supported by large numbers might be
proposed under a supermajority rule, even though it attracts little attention under
majority rule.
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than sixty percent of the legislature than from bills supported by
between fifty and sixty percent. Because a sixty percent
supermajority rule will block spending that only can secure the
support of between fifty and sixty percent of the legislature, it
will block the least efficient spending enacted under majority
rule and therefore should result in a higher percentage of effi-
cient spending being passed. Because supermajority rules in-
crease the percentage of spending that is efficient, they filter out
inefficient legislation." 3
Moreover, the stronger the filtering effect, the more likely that
supermajority rules will be efficient. As the filtering effect be-
comes stronger, legislation passed by a supermajority will be
more efficient and legislation passed by a mere majority will be
less efficient. Thus, the stronger the filtering effect, the more
likely that legislation passed by a mere majority will produce
negative net benefits and that the supermajority rule therefore
will be efficient.'
Consequently, a supermajority rule is more likely to be effi-
cient the more inefficient spending under majority rule is and
the more filtering there is. The extent to which one of these con-
ditions must hold in order for a supermajority rule to be efficient
will depend on the extent to which the other condition holds.
The more inefficient the federal spending passed under majority
rule is, the less a supermajority rule needs to filter inefficient
legislation. Similarly, the more a supermajority rule filters out
inefficient legislation, the less inefficient total federal spending
must be. These two conditions therefore operate on a sliding
scale. Two points on this scale are worth discussing.
First, if total federal spending under majority rule were suffi-
ciently inefficient, a supermajority rule will be efficient even if it
183. We refer to this phenomenon as the "filtering effect."
184. Although a supermajority rule is more likely to be efficient if there is a strong
filtering effect, it nonetheless is true that the existence of filtering does not guaran-
tee that a supermajority rule will produce net benefits. For example, filtering
probably occurs even when majority rule functions well. In these cases, legislation
that passes with a mere majority will produce net benefits, although legislation that
passes with greater majorities will produce even greater net benefits. Whether the
filtering effect is sufficient to make a supermajority rule efficient depends on various
considerations, including the percentage of legislation passed that is inefficient.
19991 409
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
does not filter out inefficient spending at all. A supermajority
rule that does not filter out inefficient spending simply will
block a representative subset of the total federal spending
passed under majority rule. If total federal spending under ma-
jority rule produces net costs, a representative subset of this
spending should also on average produce net costs.18 5 Thus, in a
world in which total spending produces net costs, a
supermajority rule will, over time, be efficient.
Second, even if federal spending does produce net benefits, a
supermajority rule will block spending that produces net costs if
the filtering effect is sufficiently strong. 86 For example, if two-
thirds of the spending that is passed under majority rule is effi-
cient, a supermajority rule still may be efficient if a sufficiently
large percentage of the inefficient spending is enacted only with
a mere majority.
If either of these two conditions hold, a spending
supermajority rule will be efficient. We believe that both of
these conditions hold and therefore the case for the efficiency of
the spending supermajority rule is especially strong. First, we
maintain there are strong reasons to believe that total federal
spending passed under majority rule is more inefficient than
efficient. Second, we contend that a supermajority rule is likely
to have a strong filtering effect.
(1) The Degree of Inefficient Spending Under Majority
Rule
A strong argument exists that total federal spending under
majority rule produces net costs. We already have set the
groundwork for this argument in Section I, where we demon-
strated that federal spending has grown enormously in recent
generations and that this spending has increasingly occurred
185. Our analysis assumes the supermajority rule either permits or prevents a
spending program's enactment, but does not cause a spending program to be revised.
Although actual supermajority rules would cause spending programs to be revised,
this assumption simplifies the analysis without altering the substantive conclusions.
186. The degree of filtering required will depend on the percentage of efficient and
inefficient spending, as well as other factors, such as the percentage of legislation
that could pass only with a mere majority.
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outside of the area of traditional public interest goods." 7 We also
presented a theory of special interests that helps to explain
these changes.
8 1
In this section, we plan to show in the broadest outlines why
one might believe that there are net costs from total federal
spending under majority rule. We cannot, in an article of this
scope, present a detailed assessment of the efficiency of federal
spending, nor can we hope that all readers will agree with our
assessment of every federal program. 9 Instead, we seek only to
explain how one can arrive at the conclusion that overall federal
spending produces net costs, by attempting to show that a large
number of federal programs in different areas produce net costs.
These programs fall into two classes. First, there are programs
that clearly are not public interest goods, such as subsidies for
farmers or small businesses. There is a strong presumption that
such spending is inefficient. 9 ° Second, there are programs that
potentially could be public interest goods if they were designed
appropriately, but which in fact are structured inefficiently-
programs such as unnecessary weapons systems.
There are many federal programs that clearly are not public
goods. Indeed, the largest area of federal spending, entitlements
for the elderly such as Social Security and Medicare, fall into
this category.' These programs operate to redistribute income
from the younger generation to current retirees,'92 but such re-
distribution cannot be considered a traditional public good. The
187. See supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 40-66, 74-143.
189. Even if the reader disagrees with our assessment of one or more of the feder-
al programs, such disagreement over individual programs does not undermine our
more general point that there are a large number of inefficient federal programs
throughout the federal budget.
190. See Hayek, supra note 28, at 518-19, 523, 525.
191. In 1994, expenditures on Social Security and Medicare comprised 38% of total
federal expenditures, exclusive of net interest on the debt. For the figures from
which this calculation was computed, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CON-
GRESS, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOic FISCAL YEARS 1996-2000, at 40-41
(1995).
192. See EPSTEIN, supra note 35, at 150; FERRARA, supra note 59, at 52; ROBERT-
SON, supra note 4, at 121, 154; Peter J. Ferrara & John R. Lott, Jr., Rates of Re-
turn Promised by Social Security to Today's Young Workers, in SOCIAL SECURITY,
PROSPECTS FOR REAL REFORI 13, 13 (Peter J. Ferrara ed., 1985).
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elderly are not the poor. As with any other demographic group,
the elderly consist of people from all economic classes. Although
the elderly are disadvantaged in certain respects, they are also
among the wealthiest groups in society. 9 ' Thus, one cannot jus-
tify redistributing income to the elderly on the ground that vir-
tually all people would choose to transfer funds to the elderly if
there were no free rider problem.
194
The redistributions that Social Security and Medicare effect
also cannot be justified as necessary to providing retirement
193. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER 426-27
(1992) (stating that "although the elderly constitute only 12 percent of the popula-
tion, they hold about 40 percent of all the capital assets in the United States").
194. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing the free rider argu-
ment for redistribution to the poor). One might argue that the tremendous political
strength of Social Security disproves our claim that many people would not choose
to transfer funds to the elderly. This argument, however, confuses political strength
with genuine beliefs about the public interest and the desire to transfer money. To
conclude that the public wants to redistribute wealth to the elderly because Social
Security is strong politically, one must make two inferences: first, that the political
strength reflects the genuine beliefs of the public that there should be a redistribu-
tion to the elderly and, second, that those who vote for transfers to the elderly
based on their genuine beliefs would also individually transfer money from their
bank accounts if there were no free rider problem.
Both inferences are problematic. First, the political strength of a program is a
function of at least three types of support: (1) support based on voters' beliefs about
the public interest; (2) support based on individual voters' assessment of the benefits
and costs of the program to them; and (3) support generated by a group's influence
over legislators and the public through lobbying and other political activities. It is
true that some people view Social Security as furthering the public interest and that
the program therefore does have some of the first type of support. Social Security
has far more of the second and third types of support, however, stemming from the
fact that the elderly have the characteristics of a special interest and constitute a
large voting block.
Second, even those people who vote for Social Security based on their genuine
beliefs would not individually choose to contribute charity to the elderly as a general
group if they were not required to do so. People who support Social Security out of
a genuine belief act largely out of rational ignorance. Because they have no incentive
to study the issue, these voters mistake being disadvantaged in one respect
(elderliness) with being disadvantaged generally. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Pri-
vate Provision of Unemployment Insurance, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 61, 118 (describing
the mistake of focusing on one characteristic rather than on an entire situation as
common). If these individuals actually had to decide to whom they would contribute
charity, they might not focus their charity on the elderly generally, but instead tar-
get truly disadvantaged groups, such as the poor or the sick (including the truly
disadvantaged elderly). Thus, one cannot justify Social Security as enforcing the de-
sires of people to transfer funds to the elderly.
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pensions or health insurance to the elderly. Individuals could
secure income after retirement by saving money over a lifetime
and then purchasing an annuity at retirement. 95 To ensure that
people actually save money during their working years, the gov-
ernment could require them to save a certain amount each
year.'96 Under this arrangement, workers could accumulate re-
tirement funds without the government either running the pro-
gram or redistributing income.
A similar arrangement also could be established that would
provide the elderly with access to health insurance without
Medicare. To mention just one possible arrangement, the elderly
could be required to purchase a long-term heath insurance policy
at age sixty-five.' 97 To ensure that workers can afford the insur-
ance, the government could require them to set aside a specified
amount each year before retirement.'98 These arrangements
would make private health insurance available to the elderly
without redistributing income between generations.
Because Social Security and Medicare do not provide tradi-
tional public interest goods, these programs should be regarded
as substantial. These inefficiencies, moreover, are substantial.
First, the redistribution from one generation to another imposes
significant costs, including the decreased incentive to work for
both the generation that receives the subsidy and the generation
that must pay for it. Apart from the redistribution, the structure
of these programs is also inefficient. Commentators have criti-
195. See FERRARA, supra note 59, at 340-44.
196. To prevent people from investing their savings recklessly, regulations could
limit investment of these savings to diversified funds. See, e.g., id. at 341 (explain-
ing a proposal that would require contributions to certain funds and close govern-
mental regulation).
197. A system of compulsory private health insurance would, of course, have to ad-
dress various practical problems-issues that are beyond the scope of an article on
supermajority rules. It may be useful to note, however, that a private system would
offer a variety of methods to address one of the most important problems: providing
access to health insurance for those with preexisting conditions while avoiding seri-
ous adverse selection. Such methods include permitting insureds to use a combina-
tion of catastrophic insurance and medical savings accounts, establishing an assigned
risk pool for persons who cannot obtain insurance, and prohibiting insurers from
considering preexisting conditions. For a general discussion of these issues, see EP-
STEIN, supra note 35; GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 193, at 440.
198. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 193, at 440.
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cized many features of both Social Security and Medicare, in-
cluding the government's investment of retirement savings in
government bonds rather than the stock market 99 and the
methods Medicare uses to reimburse health care providers."'
Many other government programs also are not traditional
public goods. These programs range from the numerous exam-
ples of "corporate welfare,"20' such as farm programs or pro-
grams for small businesses, to the post office,20 2 which easily
could be privatized. °3
Other government programs operate in areas that are at least
potentially traditional public goods. Although these programs
could be efficient, nothing guarantees that they are structured
or operate efficiently. Indeed, there are several areas where such
programs seem to produce net costs. We mention only three of
these areas. First, substantial parts of defense spending are
hard to justify. These activities include unnecessary military
bases that are maintained to distribute federal defense dollars to
the local economy, and weapons systems that either are not
needed or are produced at excessive cost.20 4 Second, many have
referred to federal spending on infrastructure, such as highway
construction, and transportation, such as Amtrak, as unneces-
199. See 1 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE 1994-1996 AD-
VISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 25-27 (1997).
200. See Edmund F. Haisimaier, Why America's Health Care System Is in Trouble,
in CRITICAL ISSUES: A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA 1, 25 (Stuart M. But-
ler & Edmund F. Haislmaier eds., 1989).
201. The federal government currently spends more than $65 billion on more than
100 programs that provide subsidies to American businesses. See DEAN STANSEL &
STEPHEN MOORE, FEDERAL AID TO DEPENDENT CORPORATIONS: CLINTON AND CON-
GRESS FAIL TO ELIMINATE BUSINESS SUBSIDIES (Cato Institute Briefing Papers No.
28, 1997) (discussing 55 of the most visible, expensive, and unjustified programs).
202. See J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, PROTECTING COMPETITION FROM
THE POSTAL MONOPOLY 60 (1996).
203. See id at 151-53.
204. See WILLIAM R. KENNEDY, JR. & ROBERT W. LEE, A TAXPAYER SURVEY OF THE
GRACE COMMISSION REPORT 60-61 (1984); DONALD LAMBRO, WASHINGTON-CITY OF
SCANDALS 108-40 (1984); Patrick J. DeSouza, Note, Regulating Fraud in Military
Procurement: A Legal Process Model, 95 YALE L.J. 390, 390-91 (1985). See generally
Karen M. Paget, Can't Touch This? The Pentagon's Budget Fortress, AM. PROSPECT,
Fall 1995, at 37, 40-41.
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sary "pork barrel" spending.2 5 Finally, critics have argued that
significant abuses exist under welfare spending programs.0 6
This short discussion provides some indication of the extent of
inefficiency in federal spending. Much federal spending is not
devoted to traditional public goods, and a significant portion of
spending on activities that potentially could constitute public
goods appears to be seriously inefficient. Thus, it is plausible
that a majority of federal spending, possibly even a large majori-
ty, is wasteful.
Another factor supports this conclusion. People tend to judge
whether a spending program is justified by examining the bene-
fits and costs of the program in isolation from other' consider-
ations. But for two reasons, this method often assesses federal
spending programs too favorably.
First, examining a program in isolation from other consider-
ations ignores the burdens that are imposed on taxpayers by
other inefficient government programs. When examined in isola-
tion, some programs appear to be traditional public interest
goods and therefore to produce net benefits. Although these pro-
grams have the potential to produce net benefits, they often will
do so only if government spending were at the low level that
would exist if there were little inefficient spending. At this level,
taxes would be low and the economic pie would be large. Be-
cause citizens would be richer, they would be able to afford ad-
ditional goods from the government. By contrast, under a gov-
ernment with large amounts of inefficient spending, citizens are
poorer and less able to afford government spending. As a result,
programs that would have produced net benefits if taxes were
low produce net costs because taxes are high. Thus, at the cur-
rent level of spending, citizens might be better off if a
supermajority rule blocked programs like the space program.
These programs might make sense if taxes were low, but do not
when they are high.
205. See SENATOR WILLIAMI PROXMIRE, THE FLEECING OF AMERICA 91-104 (1980).
206. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980,
at 18-19 (1984); MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION 184-99
(1992).
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Second, examining a program in isolation from other consider-
ations ignores the question of whether that program should be
conducted at the national or state level. A federal spending pro-
gram that appears to produce net benefits might operate even
more favorably at the state or local level. °7 In that case, citizens
benefit when the supermajority rule blocks the program and the
spending instead is enacted at the state level. °8
(2) The Degree of Filtering
The second condition that affects the efficiency of a
supermajority rule is the extent of the filtering effect. We believe
that supermajority rules are likely to have a strong filtering ef-
fect on inefficient spending for several reasons. First, it is nor-
mally assumed that the more votes a piece of legislation re-
ceives, the better the legislation.2 9 Thus, a belief in filtering is
really part of the conventional wisdom. Our Constitution also
207. Some examples of federal spending programs that may generate net benefits
at the federal level but would operate better at the state level are the various
means-tested welfare programs, including cash assistance and food stamps. See
MURRAY, supra note 206, at 227-30 (advocating that all federal welfare programs be
repealed and that the responsibility for welfare be left to the states).
208. One might argue that even if a large percentage of federal spending results in
net costs, this does not demonstrate that total federal spending has net costs. For
instance, federal spending includes all national defense spending. Although one
might argue over how much national defense spending is needed, it is clear that a
small core of such spending-that necessary to defend against invasion and to deter
nuclear attacks-is extremely beneficial and produces overwhelming net benefits. Un-
der this view, however inefficient federal defense spending is, it can never be benefi-
cial to eliminate all of it because that also would eliminate the overwhelming bene-
fits derived from the small core of necessary programs.
Fortunately, this hypothetical issue need not be a distraction. The main reason
we argue that total federal spending likely produces negative net benefits is heuris-
tic. In this way, it can be shown that a supermajority rule does not have to filter
out inefficient legislation for the rule to be efficient. Furthermore, we can maintain
our heuristic point even if the small core of national defense spending does render
the benefits of total federal spending to be positive. In that event, our argument
would change slightly. We simply would assume that Congress knows not to cut the
small core of national defense spending. Thus, we would argue that if the
supermajority rule causes Congress to cut a random sample of federal spending, oth-
er than the small core of defense spending, this will be efficient.
209. See, e.g., Baker & Dinkin, supra note 164, at 56-62; Robin Charlow, Judicial
Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527,
591-92, 604-05 (1994).
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makes such an assumption.21 ° If legislation that passes with a
supermajority is no better on average than that which passes
with a mere majority, there is little reason to require a
supermajority to amend the Constitution.
Second, a strong argument exists that the greater the net ben-
efits produced by a bill, the more votes it will be able to secure.
Assume that voters evaluate a bill based on the net benefits that
it confers on them and that legislators support a bill because of
its popularity with the voters. Under these assumptions, bills
with the largest net benefits should on average be the most pop-
ular with both voters and legislators.
Moreover, the argument that a bill with more net benefits will
be more popular holds regardless of whether the legislation
broadly diffuses benefits throughout the population or confers
concentrated benefits on special interest groups. As to both types
of legislation, the bills that will pass with a supermajority will
confer greater net benefits than those that would secure a mere
majority and therefore would not pass. Clearly, legislation that
broadly diffuses benefits throughout the population will be more
popular and therefore will secure more legislative support if the
net benefits are large than if they are small. But this is also
true of legislation that confers concentrated benefits on special
interest groups. To secure the support of a supermajority rather
than a majority, a special interest group must expend additional
amounts on lobbying and other political activities. These addi-
tional expenditures will only make economic sense for legislation
that provides the largest net benefits for the group.2 ' For bene-
210. A belief in filtering is also one basis for majority rule. It generally is believed
that legislation supported by a majority is better than any legislation supported by
the minority. See MUELLER, supra note 35, at 158. In supporting supermajority
rules, we do not disagree with the claim that the more votes, the better the legisla-
tion. We simply believe that because special interests create a one-way bias in favor
of spending, a mere majority is not enough to justify federal spending. We continue
to believe, however, that legislation supported by a supermajority is better than that
supported by a majority, which in turn is better than that supported by a minority.
211. This argument assumes, of course, that special interests cannot cheaply in-
crease the support for their programs through additional rent seeking. Rent seeking
is generally expensive. By increasing the majority required to pass spending legisla-
tion, a supermajority rule increases the costs of obtaining special interest spending.
We therefore predict that special interests would respond to this increase in price by
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fits this large to be available, however, the legislation generally
would need to have large overall benefits. Therefore, even spe-
cial interests will tend to secure supermajority support for only
the special interest legislation that produces the biggest overall
net benefits.
There is not, of course, a perfect correlation between legisla-
tive support and net benefits. Consequently, supermajority rules
sometimes will block efficient spending and at other times will
permit inefficient spending to be enacted. Perfect filtering
should not be expected, but neither is it required. A
supermajority rule still will filter if the spending that it permits
to pass is merely more efficient on average than the spending
that it blocks.
There is one last argument for the existence of filtering. Al-
though we assumed previously that voters evaluate legislation
based on the net benefits they derive from it, we also believe
that people vote, in part, based on their genuine convictions
about what programs are in the public interest.212 We believe
that the legislation that has the most support because the public
perceives that it promotes the public interest, however, also
tends to be the most efficient legislation.213 Such legislation in-
cludes traditional public goods, such as national defense, police,
courts, infrastructure, assistance for the truly poor, and other
traditional public interest spending.21 4 Thus, it is unlikely that a
supermajority rule will eliminate core public interest goods.
(3) Values Other than Efficiency
Although we have argued that a supermajority rule for spend-
ing would be efficient, the case for the rule does not require that
one accept efficiency as the measure of a political institution's
value. Other normative approaches, including utilitarianism and
individual rights theories, also support supermajority rules.
engaging in less rent seeking.
212. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 194 (arguing that the popularity of Social Security is not due
primarily to a public belief that it promotes the public interest).
214. See supra note 72.
418 [Vol. 40:365
SUPERMAJORITY RULES
Utilitarianism is very similar to efficiency theory. Under both
theories, the appropriate action depends on a summation of its
benefits and costs. The two theories, however, measure benefits
(and costs) differently. Efficiency weighs an individual's willing-
ness and ability to pay for a benefit.215 Utilitarianism, by con-
trast, measures benefits according to the effect on an individu-
al's interest without considering the individual's ability to pay.216
This difference has its biggest impact with regard to actions that
affect poor people. Although an efficiency theory might measure
the benefits from a program that provides services to poor peo-
ple as small, because poor people can pay only a small amount
for the services, utilitarianism might assess the benefit from the
services as much larger if it significantly improves the poor peo-
ple's lives.217
Thus, in determining whether the efficiency of supermajority
rules also shows that such rules are justified under utilitarian-
ism, the main question is whether supermajority rules adequate-
ly protect the poor. We argue below that supermajority rules
treat the poor quite favorably. Here, we can state only that pro-
grams that benefit the poor often are deemed to be public
goods, 1 ' and those programs therefore should pass under
supermajority rules. Moreover, supermajority rules also protect
the poor from legislation that unfairly benefits other groups.
Thus, both efficiency theory and utilitarianism justify
supermajority rules.
Individual rights theories differ significantly from both utili-
tarianism and efficiency theory. Individual rights theories do not
attempt to aggregate benefits and costs but instead hold that
one should respect certain rights or principles regardless of the
consequences.2 9  Although there are significant distinctions
215. See POSNER, supra note 37, at 12-16.
216. See EPSTEIN, supra note 35, at 32-33; POSNER, supra note 37, at 12-16; Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Con-
tracts Should Not Be Construed against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171, 251 (1995).
217. See POSNER, supra note 37, at 14; Rappaport, supra note 216, at 251.
218. See, e.g., Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care,
13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 55, 55 (1984); Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers,
Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 542, 543 (1969).
219. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30-31 (1971).
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among different individual rights theories,2 the effects of
supermajority rules are congenial to the majority of such theo-
ries. Supermajority rules tend to promote spending for public
interest goods and to constrain spending for private goods. Virtu-
ally all individual rights theories allow or require the govern-
ment to provide traditional public interest goods. 22' These theo-
ries also generally condemn actions that redistribute resources
because of political power rather than public purpose.222
b. Holdout Costs
Although a supermajority rule for all new spending bills
would likely prevent more harmful spending than beneficial
spending, that rule also would increase significantly the holdout
costs incident to the passage of ordinary appropriations bills.
Thus, we do not advocate a supermajority rule for all new
spending bills. Instead, we propose a two-tiered supermajority
rule that would reduce holdout costs substantially.
As we discussed previously, supermajority rules increase hold-
out costs, and one therefore must be careful about applying
them to legislation that is prone to such costs. The thirteen an-
nual appropriation acts, which authorize government spending
for the following year, involve significant holdout costs under
majority rule.223 At the year's end, the spending authority con-
ferred by these laws terminates. Unless Congress passes new
appropriation acts, the government cannot conduct ordinary
business and must shut down, thereby imposing enormous costs
on the public that relies on the government for a range of bene-
220. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 193 (1986); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS 335 (1985); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, & UTOPIA 183-89 (1974);
RAWLS, supra note 219, at 30-31.
221. For example, Dworkin, Epstein, and Rawls all generally permit public interest
goods. Nozick, however, would only permit one type of public interest good-protec-
tive services. See NOZICK, supra note 220, at 52-53.
222. It is true, of course, that the persons who subscribe to these theories might
not advocate supermajority rules. In most cases, we believe the primary reason is
that they operate from different factual premises. For example, they may not believe
there is bias towards excessive private interest spending. Our point is that, given
our factual premises, supermajority rules are amenable to these theories.
223. See 1 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW (2d ed. 1991).
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fits and services.2 4 The threat of a government shutdown gives
significant leverage to holdouts. Unless the majority coalition
can secure the support of some of the minority, a government
shutdown will result and the entire Congress likely will be held
responsible.
Because supermajority rules confer additional leverage on
holdouts, holdout costs are even higher under supermajority
rules. A supermajority rule that applied to appropriation acts
might cause government shutdowns and the inclusion of ineffi-
cient provisions.225 Because of the high holdout costs already in-
volved in passing ordinary appropriation bills, we do not recom-
mend a rule that would require a supermajority to pass such
bills.
226
In contrast, we would require a supermajority to pass bills
that establish or expand entitlement programs for two reasons.
First, holdout costs are much lower for entitlement spending.
Under an entitlement program, Congress usually passes a per-
manent appropriation that allocates whatever funds the pro-
gram requires. 227 Consequently, entitlement programs do not
require annual appropriations in order to operate and therefore
are not exposed to holdouts in the appropriations process. Al-
224. See Alan L. Feld, Shutting Down the Government, 69 B.U. L. REV 971, 981
(1989).
225. It is even possible, although not likely, that such a supermajority rule could
increase the amount of private interest spending. If members who seek increases in
such spending act as holdouts, they might force Congress to pass spending that is
as large as--or even larger than-that which would have been enacted under majori-
ty rule.
226. Decisionmaking costs are also higher under supermajority rules, but we do not
believe that such costs argue against requiring a supermajority to pass appropriation
bills. Although it would take more effort and time to secure a supermajority for each
appropriations bill, we do not believe that would present a difficult problem for Con-
gress. Holdout costs are the major problem.
227. See Stith, supra note 149, at 607. Some entitlement programs do require that
Congress pass an annual appropriation. See i&i at 607 n.92. Under these programs,
however, Congress feels obligated to pass the appropriation so long as the law that
establishes the entitlement is in place, and some commentators have argued that
benefits. might be paid even if the annual appropriation were not passed. See STAFF
OF THE HOUSE COuI. ON THE BUDGET, 103D CONG., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
PROCESS: 1974-1993, at 11 (Comm. Print 1994); ALLEN SCHiCK, THE CAPAcITY TO
BUDGET 41 (1990). Thus, even entitlement programs that require annual appropria-
tions are not subject to the normal annual appropriations process.
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though bills that establish or expand entitlement programs are
subject to holdouts, they are far less vulnerable than appropria-
tion bills. Because the entitlement program or its expansion is
not yet in existence, the public does not yet rely on the program,
and there is much less pressure to enact it by a specific date. If
holdouts demand unreasonable concessions, Congress simply can
postpone the establishment or expansion of the program until a
more convenient time.22' Thus, application of a supermajority
rule to entitlement programs would create only minor holdout
costs.
The second reason to require a supermajority to establish or
expand entitlement programs is that entitlement programs are
more difficult to eliminate or reduce than programs funded
through the ordinary appropriations process. Because entitle-
ment programs are funded by permanent appropriations, 229 elim-
inating or reducing such programs requires passing a law that
otherwise would not be necessary.30 In contrast, programs fund-
ed through ordinary appropriations can be effectively eliminated
simply by failing to pass a new appropriation and can be cut
merely by reducing funding in an appropriation bill that would
have to be passed anyway.23' Moreover, benefits under entitle-
ment programs often are represented as rights rather than sim-
ply subsidies, in part because the programs are not subject to
232the appropriations process. Eliminating or cutting such pro-
grams is difficult because Congress then appears to be violating
the rights of the beneficiaries.233
4. The Ninety Percent Supermajority Rule
Instead of a supermajority rule that applies to individual ap-
propriation bills, we propose a supermajority rule that applies to
228. See, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 227, at 41.
229. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in
the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 398 (1998); Stith, supra
note 149, at 607 n.91.
231. See, e.g., Stith, supra note 149, at 604-05 nn.70-72 (stating that programs that
are not obligated or appropriated expire at the end of the year).
232. See SCHICK, supra note 227, at 41.
233. See id
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the total amount of government spending enacted by Congress
for a particular year. Under our rule, a supermajority would be
required to authorize total government spending in excess of a
specified percentage of the previous year's spending. 34 As ex-
plained below, we estimate that ninety percent is the appropri-
ate percentage. Thus, if Congress wanted to spend more than
ninety percent of the total amount spent last year, a
supermajority of each house of Congress would have to pass a
resolution authorizing it to do so. So long as the resolution was
passed, Congress would not be required to pass individual
spending bills with a supermajority. If Congress were willing to
spend ninety percent or less than the amount spent in the previ-
ous year, no resolution would be required and it could simply
pass spending bills with a mere majority vote.
a. Holdout Costs
This ninety percent supermajority rule would avoid the hold-
out problems that would arise under a supermajority rule for all
spending bills. Under the ninety percent rule, holdouts would
have much less leverage. If some members attempted to obtain
unreasonable concessions by threatening to prevent the passage
of spending bills and cause a government shutdown, a majority
of each house could simply enact spending at ninety percent of
the previous year's amount. With the threat of a government
shutdown eliminated, 35 Congress would be in a far better posi-
tion to bargain with holdouts and pass additional spending.
2 36
234. One difference between a supermajority rule for increases in total spending
and such a rule for individual spending bills is that the former would limit existing
entitlement programs. Increases in spending under entitlement legislation would be
counted in the amount of total spending, even though such increases would have
been provided for under existing law. See, e.g., id. at 41-42 (stating that spending
has increased significantly under existing entitlements).
235. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution:
The Anatomy of the 1995-96 Budget 'Train Wreck," 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 603-
09 (1998) (arguing that the government shutdowns of 1995 were caused in part by
holdouts nnwilling to compromise).
236. The percentage of the previous year's total spending that should require a
supermajority vote depends on a balance between two considerations that point in
opposite directions. First, the percentage should be high enough so that a majority
of Congress is willing to enact temporary spending at this level while it negotiates
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b. Impeding Private Interest Spending
A ninety percent supermajority rule also would result in more
efficient spending. Like the supermajority rule for all spending
bills, the ninety percent rule would require Congress to secure
additional support for the spending that it enacts. Although the
ninety percent rule differs from a supermajority rule for all
spending bills, the differences would not prevent the ninety per-
cent rule from also improving the efficiency of federal spending.
The most important distinction between the two rules is that
the ninety percent rule does not guarantee that a supermajority
will approve the individual spending bills. One might therefore
question whether the ninety percent rule will limit federal
spending. Nonetheless, the rule is likely to constrain federal
spending because the members of the minority would attempt to
use their leverage over the spending resolution to acquire some
power over the content of individual spending bills.23 They could
do this by refusing to approve spending resolutions until the
budget process was structured to confer some credible informa-
tion on them about the content of federal spending. 3 ' Under this
type of budget process, the minority could use its leverage over
the spending resolution to ensure that Congress takes its desires
into account when determining the content of federal spending.2"'
with holdouts. The percentage, however, should not be so high that a congressional
majority is willing to enact permanent spending at this level and thereby avoid the
supermajority requirement. It is our rough judgment that the optimal percentage is
90.
237. This is a process referred to as "bargaining in the shadow of the law." See
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
238. The minority could argue persuasively that the decision on whether to pass
the spending resolution cannot be made intelligently without this information.
239. There are two basic approaches to structuring the budget process that would
provide the minority with credible information. First, Congress might vote on the
spending resolution towards the end of the budget process, after the spending bills
were enacted (or at least were reported out of committee). This would enable the
minority to evaluate the spending bills that actually were passed. It would have the
disadvantage, however, of requiring the minority to vote on the spending resolution
at the end of the budget process. If the minority considered the spending bills to be
seriously deficient and refused to pass the spending resolution, it would be costly
and difficult to revise the spending bills. See generally Krishnakumar, supra note
235, at 603-09 (demonstrating that the impact of evaluating major spending legisla-
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Although the minority would be able to influence the content
of federal spending, it would exercise this influence differently
than it would under a supermajority rule for all spending bills.
Under that rule, the minority would decide whether to support
each spending bill separately. By contrast, under the ninety per-
cent rule, the minority would decide whether to support the
spending resolution based on the total package of spending bills
that Congress is likely to pass.
Although the minority will evaluate spending bills as a pack-
age rather than individually, its influence still is likely to im-
prove the efficiency of federal spending. When evaluating wheth-
er the spending package promotes their legislative goals, mem-
bers of the minority probably would evaluate the package as the
sum of the individual spending bills that it contained.240 Thus,
tion at the end of the budget process can be very costly, as evidenced by the budget
battle of 1995 and the subsequent government shutdown).
Second, Congress might structure the budget process to require passage of the
spending resolution at an early stage, but include rules and instructions on the level
and content of spending within the resolution, including the total amount of spend-
ing, the amounts allocated to different budget functions, and significant changes in
spending decisions from the prior year. These rules and instructions would be bind-
ing on Congress, but could be changed by a supermajority vote. One problem with
this approach is that past experience suggests that Congress may be hesitant to
make these difficult decisions early in the budget process. See STANLEY E.
COLLENDER, THE GUiDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET: FIscAL 1997, at 54-56 (1996).
Many intermediate approaches also could be devised that would ameliorate the
defects of either approach. We describe just one such approach as an illustration.
Under this procedure, Congress attempts, at an early stage in the process, to pass a
spending resolution that contains binding rules and instructions with a
supermajority. If Congress is unable to schedule or pass the resolution, congressional
rules would provide it with two choices. First, Congress can pass a spending resolu-
tion with only majority support. Then, any spending bill that passes with a
supermajority and conforms to the resolution would be deemed passed under con-
gressional rules and would be authorized under the 90% rule. In this way, Congress
could authorize its total spending on a statute-by-statute basis. Second, if Congress
did not pass the spending resolution with even a mere majority, a default rule ap-
plies that uses the previous year's spending resolution, but at 90% of the previous
year's .spending levels. The default rule would force Congress to act as if it will be
unable to pass the spending resolution. Because this will force committees to report
unattractive spending bills, it may pressure members to reach an early compromise.
240. See generally Garrett, supra note 230, at 390 (discussing that the current bud-
get structure considers programs funded through annual appropriations bills as one
package).
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the popularity of the package would be a function of the popu-
larity of the individual spending bills that it contained. If the
package primarily contained spending bills that individually
could secure the support of only a majority, the total package
would be unlikely to secure a supermajority. By contrast, if the
package mainly contained bills that individually could pass with
a supermajority, the entire package would be likely to be sup-
ported by a supermajority. The effect of the ninety percent rule
therefore should be similar- to that of the supermajority rule for
individual spending bills-the promotion of efficiency in federal
spending.
There are other ways in which the ninety percent
supermajority rule would function differently from a
supermajority rule for individual spending bills, but these differ-
ences would not prevent the ninety percent rule from promoting
efficiency. First, the minority has less leverage to restrain ac-
tions by the majority under the ninety percent rule. Under a
supermajority rule for individual spending bills, no spending
could be enacted without the support of a supermajority. Thus, a
minority that prevented the passage of an inefficient spending
bill would know that its approval would be needed to pass any
subsequent spending bill in that area. By contrast, under the
ninety percent rule a simple majority could always choose to
avoid the supermajority requirement and pass spending bills
that totalled less than ninety percent of the amount spent in the
previous year. The existence of this option, however, is unlikely
to reduce the leverage of the antispending minority significantly
because the majority generally would deem a reduction in total
spending of more than ten percent to be extremely undesirable.241
241. Although a majority would find it unattractive to enact spending for the year
at 90% of the level in the previous year, it would not necessarily consider it unde-
sirable to enact temporary spending at that level to deal with holdouts. The princi-
pal leverage that holdouts have is that they can force a government shutdown by
preventing the passage of appropriation bills. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note
235, at 606-09. A majority's ability to enact temporary spending at 90% of the level
of the previous year thus would significantly reduce the power of holdouts. A majori-
ty would not deem the passage of such temporary spending unattractive because the
public would understand that it was done only to prevent the government from
shutting down and was likely to be revised upward soon.
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A final distinction between the two types of supermajority
rules is that the ninety percent rule is more prone to logrolling.
Under a supermajority for all spending bills, members vote on
each spending bill separately. Although one member may agree
to vote for bill A in exchange for another member's agreement to
vote for bill B, the transactions costs of such arrangements are
high.242 There is no enforcement mechanism that prevents one of
the members from breaking his promise.243 By contrast, under
the ninety percent rule, members would decide whether to pass
the spending resolution on the basis of the entire package of
spending bills. When an entire package of bills is voted on, ex-
changes can be built into the package.244 Thus, by voting for the
entire package one member would agree to vote for bill A be-
cause his vote also would help bill B to pass.245 Because no sepa-
rate agreements need to be defined or enforced, the transactions
costs of logrolling are reduced.
It is possible that the additional logrolling produced by the
ninety percent rule may cause more private interest spending by
furnishing legislators with the opportunity to pass pork-barrel
legislation.246 Any such tendency of the ninety percent rule, how-
ever, could be remedied by increasing the supermajority re-
quired to pass the spending resolution.
We conclude that the ninety percent rule would improve the
efficiency of federal spending. Although the rule would differ
from a supermajority for all spending bills in several respects, it
would still share the essential feature of constraining private
interest spending.
242. See MUELLER, supra note 30, at 82-85.
243. See id at 85 (arguing that the lack of any enforcement mechanism prevents
any credible assurance that individual members will not break their promises). More-
over, because the promise is likely to be oral, there may be genuine misunderstand-
ings about the terms of the agreement.
244. See Garrett, supra note 230, at 397-98.
245. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 164, at 134-35 (describing this process
as "implicit logrolling"); MUELLER, supra note 30, at 84-86 (describing transaction
costs involved in ordinary logrolling).
246. This effect of logrolling is uncertain. While logrolling can produce local, pork-
barrel spending, it also may cause efficient spending, as when a small group re-
ceives large benefits from a spending provision that could not pass without vote
trading. See MUELLER, supra note 30, at 83-84 (describing efficient and inefficient
uses of logrolling).
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5. Circumventing Restrictions on Spending with Tax
Preferences and Regulations
Although the two-part spending supermajority rule would re-
strict private interest spending by Congress, one might argue
that the rule will not reduce the overall amount of special inter-
est legislation. Special interests might secure benefits through
other types of legislation that would not require a supermajority.
First, instead of obtaining a spending subsidy, special interests
might secure benefits through regulatory legislation. For exam-
ple, rather than providing workers with Social Security retire-
ment benefits, Congress might require employers to provide pen-
sions. Second, special interests might also secure benefits
through a tax preference. A reduction in taxes could be struc-
tured to equal the subsidy that the special interest would have
received.
Although Congress is likely to substitute some special interest
regulatory or tax legislation for special interest spending legisla-
tion, a spending supermajority rule would still result in a sub-
stantial reduction of the total amount of special interest legisla-
tion because it would force special interests to pursue their ben-
efits with methods that incur greater political opposition. Regu-
latory and tax legislation are not perfect substitutes for spend-
ing legislation. Although regulatory and tax legislation can mim-
ic spending legislation, they often differ in terms of public per-
ceptions,247 the routes they must follow in the legislative pro-
cess,248 and the groups that they affect. 249 Thus, the opposition
that a special interest would incur in securing a benefit under
regulatory or tax legislation often will differ from the opposition
it would face under spending legislation.250
Under the existing regime of majority rule, each special inter-
est will choose to obtain benefits through the method that incurs
247. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislature Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 61-64 (1990).
248. See Garrett, supra note 230, at 397-401.
249. See generally BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 164; MUELLER, supra note
30.
250. See generally Shaviro, supra note 247, at 61-64 (indicating that special inter-
ests are treated much differently by Congress with respect to tax legislation, than
they are with other types of legislation).
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the least opposition. Special interests seek benefits under spend-
ing legislation only when it is easier than obtaining benefits un-
der regulatory or tax legislation.25' If a spending supermajority
rule forces a special interest to seek regulatory or tax benefits
rather than spending benefits, it will have forced the special in-
terest to incur additional opposition.252 Consequently, some spe-
cial interests that would have received spending benefits would
not be able to secure regulatory or tax benefits. The total
amount of special interest legislation should therefore be re-
duced.
Although a supermajority rule would lead to less special inter-
est legislation, the magnitude of the reduction remains to be
determined. We contend that there are important reasons why
special interests often find tax or regulatory legislation less at-
tractive than spending legislation. Given the relative
unattractiveness of these substitutes, a supermajority rule ap-
plied to spending would lead to a substantial net reduction in
special interest legislation.
We begin with the relative unattractiveness of regulatory leg-
islation. There are various ways that regulatory legislation can
be designed to provide the same benefits that spending legisla-
tion would confer. A regulation might impose an obligation on
private parties to transfer funds to a special interest. 5 ' Alterna-
tively, a regulation might require the public to pay higher prices
for a good sold by a special interest.25 ' Finally, a regulation
might confer a monopoly on, or restrict the competition with, a
special interest.255
251. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Constitutionality, supra note 164, at 509-10
nn.124-25 (arguing that public choice theory suggests that Congress will choose to
enact programs in a way that minimizes the opposition to them).
252. See ad at 510 n.125.
253. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Ele-
ments of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA.
L. REv. 471, 478 (1988) (arguing that third parties suffer significant social costs
when they attempt to block legislation that would transfer wealth from them to spe-
cial interests).
254. See generally id. at 478-79 (indicating that regulations can impose great costs
upon competing firms by requiring them to expend resources in order to comply with
regulations, thereby driving consumer prices higher).
255. See id at 479.
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These types of regulatory legislation often will be more diffi-
cult to enact than spending legislation.256 First, the private enti-
ties who bear the burden of these regulations often will be better
organized than taxpayers generally."' For example, the consum-
ers of a specific industry, especially where the industry sells to
other large businesses, generally will be more concentrated and
politically effective than diffused and unorganized taxpayers.25
Second, regulatory benefits also may be more vulnerable to criti-
cism from the public. Often, it is not difficult to view a govern-
ment spending program as promoting a public purpose. Trans-
fers of funds from one private entity to another, however, often
appear as naked redistributions for private purposes. Such pri-
vate transfers also are more visible than government subsidies
funded out of general tax revenues, 259 and therefore are more
likely to be the object of criticism.
Consider now the ability of special interests to secure benefits
through tax preference legislation. Special interests often obtain
benefits through spending subsidies rather than tax preferences
because it is often easier to garner support for subsidies'.260 First,
subsidies generally can be portrayed as solving a problem and
therefore as a legitimate expenditure. Thus, subsidies to small
business can be characterized as promoting the economy, subsi-
dies to farmers as preserving traditional lifestyles and promot-
ing an industry, subsidies to the arts as promoting cultural life,
and subsidies to the elderly, unemployed, poor, or disabled as
256. For a discussion of other reasons why it will be difficult to substitute regula-
tory and tax preference legislation for spending legislation, see John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Still a Solution: In Further Support of Spending Superma-
jority Rules, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 530-35 (1999).
257. See generally Anthony S. McCaskey, Comment, Thesis and Antithesis of Liber-
ty of Contract: Excess in Lochner and Johnson, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 409, 461-
63 (1993) (concluding that regulatory legislation imposes significant costs upon
wealthier private entities and therefore will receive more opposition because of the
private entities' capacity to influence legislation with financial and political support).
258. See id
259. Transfers from private entities will become visible because these entities will
object to and publicize the transfers. See, e.g., Amy Barrett, The Nerds and Holly-
wood vs. the Boob-Tube, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 48; C. David Kotok, Rocky
Mountain Leaders Say Democrats Neglect Westerners' Values, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRI-
BUNE Bus. NEWS, Oct. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16342078.
260. But see Shaviro, supra note 247, at 63.
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aiding a needy group. Subsidies also can be provided in the form
of government services, such as building roads, providing insur-
ance, or generating electricity,26' which also can be portrayed as
solving a social problem.262 By contrast, tax preferences to par-
ticular groups often are seen as special privileges rather than as
attempts to solve a problem.263 Consequently, it is easier for spe-
cial interests to obtain ideological and common sense support for
spending increases and avoid significant opposition to them.26'
Another difficulty in obtaining benefits through tax preferenc-
es is that they limit the size of the benefit that a special interest
can obtain: the special interest cannot receive more than it pays
in taxes. 265 Moreover, even tax preferences that represent merely
a significant portion of a recipient's taxes may create public im-
age problems. 6 Legislation that reduces a firm's income taxes
by one-third still may create a significant stir if publicized.267
261. See Stephen Moore, Editorial, How to Slash Corporate Welfare, BALTIMORE
EVENING SuN, Apr. 10, 1995, at 9A, available in 1995 WL 2434839 (reporting that
Electric Utility Cooperatives receive two billion dollars in federal subsidies each
year).
262. See generally Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 54
(1998) (indicating that government services can often be portrayed as solving a social
problem).
263. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 247, at 61-64 (demonstrating that people often
resent tax preferences to particular groups because the preferences are perceived to
benefit the wealthy).
264. When special interests do rely on tax preferences, they often do so by sneak-
ing them through the political process as part of a larger bill rather than as a
means of solving a problem. There are, however, limits on how much can be accom-
plished through such clandestine methods. When large and publicized tax preferences
are enacted, as with the home mortgage interest deduction or the health insurance
exclusion, they are likely to benefit large portions of the population and to be justi-
fied as promoting important goals, such as home ownership or health care.
265. Our claim that the amount that a special interest pays in taxes limits the
value of tax preferences is only strictly true of traditional tax preferences. Recent
tax legislation established refundable tax credits, which require cash to be paid to
persons if the credit exceeds the taxes they owe. If such credits become more com-
mon, they may come to be viewed simply as subsidies. See Karen Tumulty, Hey,
Bill, That's Ours, TIME, July 14, 1997, at 49 (arguing that the five hundred dollars
per child tax credit is a subsidy rather than a tax reduction).
266.- See Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Reihinking the Internal
Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1289
(1993) (showing. that tax preferences given to businesses for lobbying expenses, rep-
resenting a significant portion of those businesses' taxes, are viewed as problematic).
267. *The structure of administrative agencies also may make it easier for special
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Finally, the legislative process also may make it easier for a
special interest to secure subsidies than to secure tax preferenc-
es. Because Congress typically enacts legislation through the
committee system, special interests can influence legislation by
controlling committees that are important to them.26 8 It is often
easier for a special interest to influence a committee with juris-
diction over a few industries than one with authority over many
industries s.2 9 Authorization and appropriation committees con-
trol spending legislation, and authorization committees have
jurisdiction over relatively few industries °.2 " Tax legislation, by
contrast, is controlled by tax committees that have jurisdiction
over taxes for all industries.2 ' Thus, because some of the com-
mittees that control spending are focused more narrowly than
the tax committees, special interests are able to exercise more
influence over those committees. 2
For these reasons, regulatory benefits and tax preferences are
ineffective substitutes for spending programs s.2 " Although these
interests to obtain benefits through spending rather than tax preferences. One method
of providing special interest subsidies is for Congress to pass a spending program
that appears to promote the general interest, but then to allow the special interest
to control the agency administering the program. This method makes it more diffi-
cult for the public to determine that the program is benefitting the special interest
rather than the public. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delega-
tion, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 34-39 (1982). This method, however, can be used only if
the special interest can influence the agency. It is easier for a special interest to
control an agency limited to a specific industry rather than one that has jurisdiction
over many industries. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating
Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1277, 1284-85 (1989). Although many agencies that im-
plement spending programs are limited to one industry, such as the Small Business
Administration and the Department of Agriculture, the Internal Revenue Service has
authority over every industry. See Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate
Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1203-04 (1997).
268. See Macey, supra note 253, at 512.
269. See Macey, supra note 267, at 1285 (asserting that special interests that at-
tempt to influence committees with jurisdiction over a few industries generally have
fewer special interests to compete with than special interests who attempt to influ-
ence committees with jurisdiction over many industries).
270. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PRO-
CESS 50-51 (3d ed. 1989).
271. See id
272. See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison.and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165,
1194 (1993).
273. If special interests do prove more successful in substituting tax preference and
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forms of special interest legislation probably would increase af-
ter the passage of a supermajority rule for spending, that in-
crease would be considerably smaller than the reduction in spe-
cial interest spending caused by the supermajority rule.274 The
supermajority rule thus would reduce special interest legislation
substantially.
regulatory legislation for spending legislation than we think they would be, we
would consider applying supermajority rules to those categories of legislation as well.
We would not begin constitutional reform with these more sweeping supermajority
rules for two reasons. First, there is a strong argument for incrementalism in consti-
tutional reform: begin with the least radical constitutional change arguably sufficient
to solve the problem of governance at issue. See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Con-
servatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 619, 688-97 (1994). Second, supermajority rules for regulations and tax prefer-
ences are, in certain respects, more problematic than supermajority rules for
spending. See infra notes 302-09 and accompanying text (arguing that a
supermajority rule should not be applied to regulation).
274. More generally, the argument might be made that spending supermajority
rules will lead to greater social costs by forcing rent-seekers to obtain transfers in
the form of regulations, or tax preferences that are more costly to society. See Jim
Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law in a
New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1315, 1347 (1995). The effect of any constitutional
restraints on rent-seeking is ultimately an empirical one, turning in part on "how
much the total level of transfers falls relative to the increased costs of creating
transfers." John R. Lott, Jr., Does Political Reform Increase Wealth?: or, Why the
Difference between the Chicago and Virginia Schools is Really an Elasticity Ques-
tion, 91 PUB. CHOICE 219, 220 (1997). We have offered strong reasons supporting the
proposition that the total level of transfers will fall under a spending supermajority
rule because spending transfers will decrease and their likely substitutes-transfers
in the forms of regulation or tax preferences-will not be as easy to obtain from the
legislature. See supra notes 247-73 and accompanying text. Moreover, there is little
evidence that transfers through regulation or tax preferences are more costly than
spending subsidies, but even if they were, the fact that transfers with greater social
costs generate more substantial opposition would limit their use. See Erin A. O'Hara
& William R. Dougan, Redistribution Through Discriminatory Taxes: A Contractarian
Explanation of the Rule of the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 869, 917 (1998).
Further, we should not expect individuals to react to constitutional reform only
by substituting other forms of rent-seeking. Insofar as it becomes more expensive to
obtain transfers, individuals also will substitute productive methods of obtaining re-
sources such as labor and invention. See Macey, supra note 253, at 475. Indeed, our
previous discussion of American history provides evidence that constitutional struc-
tures that cabin excessive spending have in the past led to economic growth rather
than to costly transfers. See supra notes 74-109 and accompanying text.
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We thus conclude that a supermajority rule for spending
would improve the character of federal spending compared to
that enacted under majority rule. Next we explain that
supermajority rules also are superior to absolute constitutional
limitations as a method of controlling spending.
B. Supermajority Rules Function Better than Absolute
Constitutional Limitations as to Fiscal Legislation
Although absolute limitations and supermajority rules are
both mechanisms for constraining the legislature, they differ sig-
nificantly in at least two important respects. First, absolute limi-
tations protect a right or principle irrespective of how strongly
Congress seeks to pass legislation that violates that right.
Supermajority rules, by contrast, allow Congress to pass any
legislation it chooses. They merely require that Congress secure
additional support to pass certain types of legislation.
Second, absolute limitations primarily rely on decisions by
courts whereas supermajority rules attempt to divide responsi-
bility between the courts and Congress. Under absolute limita-
tions, courts decide whether a law violates the limitation. Under
supermajority rules, by contrast, courts determine whether a bill
is the type that requires a supermajority to pass, but Congress
ultimately decides whether to pass it.
These characteristics of supermajority rules make it possible
to frame supermajority rules that place more modest responsibil-
ities on the courts than do absolute limitations. Under a regime
comprised of absolute limitations, courts alone determine wheth-
er an activity is protected. Thus, to ensure that only the right
activities are protected, the courts must consider many factors.
For example, under relevant First Amendment jurisprudence,
courts must determine not only whether an action, such as flag
burning, is speech, but also what reasons justify a restraint on
speech and whether these reasons justify a restraint in a partic-
ular case.275 By contrast, supermajority rules may place far less
responsibility on courts because courts do not make the entire
decision as to whether an activity is protected but instead share
275. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989).
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it with Congress. Supermajority rules therefore can assign sim-
pler and less controversial decisions to the courts. 76 For exam-
ple, under a rule requiring a supermajority for all spending bills,
courts merely would determine whether a statute constitutes
"spending legislation." A court would not have to decide the type
of reasons that justify the spending at issue or whether it is jus-
tified in a particular case. These decisions are not assigned to
the courts under supermajority rules because Congress makes
them.277
Given these differences, it should be no surprise that absolute
limitations and supermajority rules function well in different
circumstances. The next section discusses the circumstances un-
der which each of these two decisionmaking rules performs best.
We then argue that supermajority rules function better to gov-
ern fiscal legislation than do absolute limitations." 8
1. Circumstances When Absolute Limitations and
Supermajority Rules Function Well
Absolute limitations and supermajority rules work best under
different circumstances. Absolute constitutional limitations per-
form well when courts can be relied upon to apply a principle
that precisely captures the activity that the nation wants to pro-
tect. There are three conditions for the success of absolute limi-
276. Not all supermajority rules, however, will assign the courts more modest re-
sponsibilities than absolute limitations. For example, if one adopted a rule that re-
quired Congress to pass any legislation that violates the First Amendment by a
supermajority vote, that rule would assign the same responsibilities to the courts as
they now exercise under the First Amendment. In this Article, however, we focus
our attention on supermajority rules that place fewer duties on the courts than do
absolute limitations, because such rules allow the Constitution to assign tasks to
courts and legislatures for which they are particularly suited.
277. Under absolute limitations, Congress is not allowed to make these decisions
and therefore it is necessary for the courts to make them.
278. Under both absolute limitations and supermajority rules, courts are responsible
for the enforcement of the supermajority rule. If the legislature attempts to autho-
rize spending without a supermajority, and the executive seeks to spend that money,
how should the courts respond? We will postpone a discussion of this important is-
sue regarding supermajority rules until Section IV. Enforcement of a constitutional
limitation on spending is necessary under a regime utilizing either absolute limita-
tions or supermajority rules, therefore enforcement issues will not help decide be-
tween these two decisionmaking rules.
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tations. First, there must be a category of activity that society
wants to protect absolutely. For example, some individual rights
are plausible candidates for such protection.279 Second, a deter-
minate principle must be available to carve out the category for
protection.2"' Freedom of speech has turned out to be a relatively
determinate principle.
Third, no matter how determinate a principle is as an ab-
stract matter, it also must be one that courts are capable of en-
forcing neutrally. Thus, it also must be the kind of principle that
courts can apply using distinctive jurisprudential methods, in-
cluding interpretation through text, structure, purpose, history,
and reasoned elaboration.28' Courts also must have the incen-
tives to apply the principle neutrally. History reveals that there
is a serious risk that the Supreme Court may extend or restrict
the application of constitutional principles.8 2 In particular, when
a powerful political movement strongly desires to enact legisla-
tion, courts may narrow the constitutional provision to avoid the
wrath of these groups283 and the loss of political capital.284 For
279. See infra note 288.
280. When there is not a determinate principle and interpreting the principle re-
quires the exercise of substantial amounts of discretion, the courts have more of an
opportunity to distort the principle. See John 0. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order
of War Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1317, 1320 (1997).
281. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59-62 (stating that courts inter-
pret laws through structure, purpose, and history); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW, at xci, 1374-80 (1994) (advocating reasoned elaboration as the method for
interpreting laws); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW:
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 41-51 (rev. ed. 1994)
(discussing interpretation through structure, purpose and history); Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 368-69 (1978). If the prin-
ciple is interpreted better through other methods, such as compromise or negotiation,
the courts will be poorly suited to interpret it.
282. See generally WOLFE, supra note 281 (discussing changes in constitutional in-
terpretation over time).
283. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revo-
lutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 7-18 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court rarely, if
ever, protects a group or interest that has no support in the political process). More-
over, if the courts persist in defying the political branches, the President may ap-
point and the Senate may confirm new judges who will interpret the provision nar-
rowly.
284. Alternatively, judges might choose to depart from a constitutional provision
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instance, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the Commerce
and Spending Clauses during the New Deal in response to popu-
lar support for the President's initiatives.
285
By contrast, the successful operation of supermajority rules
mandates that Congress, rather than the judiciary, be the right
kind of final decisionmaker for the issues covered by the
supermajority rule. Supermajority rules thus are best applied in
areas in which the distinctive strengths of legislatures are use-
ful-strengths such as democratic accountability, expertise about
public policy, and the ability to negotiate compromise solutions.
By placing the ultimate decisionmaking responsibility on Con-
gress, supermajority rules do not require that courts exercise as
much responsibility as do absolute limitations. Thus, the courts
are more likely to perform their function well under superma-
jority rules.
The greater congressional role means that a supermajority
rule would not require a guiding legal principle that the nation
wants to enforce absolutely, but only a category of legislation
that the nation wants to subject to greater legislative consensus.
Moreover, while that category must be capable of definition, it is
easier to find such a category because one need not worry that
Congress will be prohibited absolutely from passing legislation
in that category. Thus, one can choose a category that is
overinclusive but simple for the courts to administer.
Moreover, supermajority rules not only make it easier to find
a well-defined category but also help the judiciary to apply this
category neutrally. Supermajority rules relieve the judiciary of
much of the political pressure that impedes its faithful interpre-
tation of absolute limitations. Under a supermajority rule, courts
will never need to decide cases in opposition to a truly powerful
political consensus. If particular legislation is supported by such
a consensus, that legislation will be able to secure the requisite
based on their own values. See David A. Dittfurth, A Theory of Equal Protection, 14
ST. MARY's L.J. 829, 836 (1983).
285. See WOLFE, supra note 281, at 164-80; Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope
of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1443-54 (1987); see also supra note
123 (discussing an alternative interpretation of the reasons why the Supreme Court
did not enforce the Commerce and Spending Clauses after 1937).
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supermajority to pass Congress. Courts therefore will face much
less pressure to distort the categories of supermajority rules
than to distort absolute limitations.
Further, if the proposed legislation is less popular and cannot
obtain the support of a supermajority, the courts cannot be as-
signed the primary responsibility for the failure of the legisla-
tion to pass. If Congress fails to obtain a supermajority, people
will view the legislation's defeat as largely Congress's fault.
When enforcing absolute limitations, the courts are isolated and
politically exposed, but in determining the applicability of
supermajority rules the courts are simply part of a larger demo-
cratic process.286
The greater stability of supermajority rules suggests that ab-
solute limitations such as the Commerce and Spending Clauses
might have had a longer life if they had been drafted as
supermajority rules. Congress then could have passed national
regulatory and spending laws during the New Deal because of
the overwhelming support for such legislation. Yet, the content
of these clauses would have remained unchanged and continued
to limit the federal government when the sense of national crisis
had abated and popular support for the legislation had waned.
In this way, supermajority rules permit the Constitution to bend
so that it does not break.2
87
286. Another reason why courts would be more likely to enforce supermajority rules
is that these rules provide the courts with fewer decisions, and thus, less discretion
than absolute limitations. It is therefore more difficult for the courts to deviate from
the supermajority rule.
287. A second reason why judges sometimes narrow a constitutional provision is to
make it conform to their own values. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 129-32 (1990). Many of the reasons
that should cause judges to resist political pressure to narrow supermajority rules
more than absolute limitations also should cause judges to consider their own values
less when interpreting a supermajority rule. First, judges have less incentive to nar-
row provisions under supermajority rules because a supermajority rule is less likely
to restrain the legislature than an absolute limitation. Congress can still pass leg-
islation under the supermajority rule if it secures the requisite number of votes, but
cannot do so under the absolute limitation. Second, supermajority rules provide judg-
es with less discretion. Finally, judges are likely to be criticized by a stronger group
for narrowing a supermajority than for narrowing an absolute limitation. Judges will
have an opportunity to narrow a supermajority rule only if a bill passes with a
mere majority; if the bill passes with a supermajority, there is no need for a judicial
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Having identified the circumstances when absolute limitations
and supermajority rules work best, we are now in a position to
show that supermajority rules are better at governing fiscal leg-
islation.
2. Fiscal Legislation Is Best Governed by Supermajority
Rules
a. Absolute Limitations Govern Fiscal Legislation Poorly
Although absolute limitations perform better than
supermajority rules in some circumstances, 28 absolute limita-
tions would not function well to constrain fiscal legislation. In-
stead, supermajority rules are much better adapted towards this
end.
resolution. When judges narrow a supermajority rule, therefore, the opponents of the
narrowing will always be a large minority of the Congress. By contrast, under an
absolute limitation, judges may narrow a provision when a large percentage of mem-
bers favor the legislation that the absolute limitation would prohibit. Thus, in some
cases, judges may narrow an absolute limitation when there are very few opponents
of such an action.
288. One area in which absolute limitations may function well is the protection of
individual constitutional rights. Absolute limitations protect individual rights more
completely than do supermajority rules because Congress cannot override absolute
limitations. See JOHN R. VILE, CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 38-39 (1993). Moreover, the courts might be able to
exercise adequately the extraordinary power of judicial review as to individual rights.
First, when the interpretation of individual rights provisions requires the exercise of
discretion, the distinct methodology employed by courts is an appropriate way of de-
ciding the issue. The judicial practice of interpreting constitutional provisions by con-
sidering text, structure, history, and purpose is a suitable method for determining
the-actual meaning of the constitutional provision. See supra note 281 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, reasoned elaboration of principles is an appropriate method for
giving content to individual rights. See VILE, supra, at 37-38.
Second, when undertaking the task of interpreting individual rights, there is
less chance that the courts will unduly narrow a provision because they are intimi-
dated by either the political branches or a political movement. The courts will be
able to defend controversial decisions regarding individual rights because there is a
general belief that the special role of the courts is to enforce individual rights. See
LANE V. SUNDERLAND, POPULAR GOVERNMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: SECURING
THE PUBLIC GOOD AND PRvATE RIGHTS 92-95 (1996). The principal concerns of the
political branches also do not lie with the definition of individual rights, but instead
with other areas such as foreign and defense matters as well as taxation and spend-
ing. Thus, the political branches generally are less likely to object vigorously to judi-
cial decisions regarding individual rights than to decisions in these other areas.
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There are few, if any, determinate principles in the fiscal area
that society would want to enforce as absolute limitations. Re-
garding debt, one might prohibit all government borrowing, but
history suggests and most observers believe that such an abso-
lute prohibition would be too restrictive.289 It likewise is difficult
to construct an absolute limit on spending or taxes. One might
prohibit spending or tax increases above some percentage of the
gross domestic product (GDP), but such caps would be too re-
strictive during times of war or economic emergency.29° It is
hard to imagine any plausible absolute limitation that does not
confer excessive discretion on the courts. For example, although
many people might believe that debt should not be issued unless
necessary for the attainment of an important public purpose,
such a standard would let the courts define the highly malleable
concept of "important public purpose."
Moreover, even if an absolute limitation were enacted, the
courts are unlikely to interpret the limitation effectively. First,
the courts are best at interpreting principles that require limited
discretion, but, as we have indicated, there are no
nondiscretionary principles that deserve absolute protection.29'
Second, even if the courts can competently exercise discretion in
some areas, they are not well-equipped to exercise discretion in
the fiscal area. The courts generally are believed to lack exper-
tise on fiscal matters because historically such matters have not
been the subject of judicial action. 92 The judicial ideal is to de-
cide cases on enduring, neutral principles. This aim-admirable
as it is on the level of meting out justice-is hardly workable
when it comes to hammering out budgets.293 Moreover, judges
289. The ability to raise debt, for example, has proved decisive in fighting major
wars, see GORDON, supra note 3, at 11, 67, and has been important for major infra-
structure improvements, see, e.g., id at 123. Arbitrary limits on borrowing, such as
restricting borrowing to two percent of the sales tax revenues, are thus problematic
for the same reasons.
290. See id at 11, 67.
291. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
292. See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715,
717, 740 (1978) (observing that courts are reluctant to impose judicial standards in
matters of the purse); Seto, supra note 151, at 1512 (arguing that courts lack exper-
tise about financial matters).
293. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Require-
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are insulated from politics. Fiscal issues, however, are largely
political issues, where compromises and political deals are inevi-
table, if not desirable.294
For similar reasons, courts also are not likely to have popular
support in enforcing absolute limitations in the fiscal area.
While there is a belief arising out of our constitutional tradition
that the courts have a special responsibility in enforcing individ-
ual rights, there is no such tradition in fiscal matters.2 5 Thus,
the courts are likely simultaneously to face enormous pressure
to interpret fiscal limitations narrowly and to possess little abili-
ty to resist such pressure.
b. Supermajority Rules Govern Fiscal Legislation Well
In contrast to absolute limitations, supermajority rules func-
tion quite well when limiting fiscal legislation. Indeed,
supermajority rules are superior to absolute limitations in virtu-
ally every category. First, there are many plausible
supermajority rules that can be applied to the fiscal powers of
the federal government. The most politically visible of these
rules is the Balanced Budget Amendment, which would require
a supermajority to borrow money. Other supermajority rules in-
clude those that require a supermajority to raise taxes, to pass
spending bills, or to authorize total spending beyond a limited
amount. The abundance of fiscal supermajority rules results be-
cause there is no single constitutional principle that we seek to
enforce. Instead, people want to restrain borrowing, spending,
and taxing, which tend to become excessive in representative
democracies. 6
ments in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 502 (1998) ("The
question of how to allocate scarce governmental resources is political; neutral princi-
ples will not provide answers.").
294. See Frug, supra note 292, at 716, 740; Fuller, supra note 281, at 400-01 (ar-
guing that the allocation of resources, such as through spending decisions, is a poly-
centric task that cannot be decided through adjudication but can be addressed in the
legislature through political deals and negotiations).
295. See Frug, supra note 292, at 740 (asserting that courts typically do not ques-
tion legislative decisions on taxes or the allocation of revenues).
296. See, e.g., Seto, supra note 151, at 1468-69.
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Second, the division of responsibility between the legislature
and the courts functions well in the fiscal area. Allowing Con-
gress to decide whether and how much to spend, borrow, or tax
is entirely appropriate. Fiscal decisions are legitimately based
on negotiation and compromise, and should be made by those
accountable to the public.297 Moreover, Congress has expertise in
fiscal matters.29
The courts also are well-suited to performing their assigned
role under supermajority rules. Under such rules, the courts
simply decide whether legislation is of the type that requires a
supermajority. Although it occasionally may be hard to identify
precisely what constitutes debt, spending, or taxation, these de-
cisions can be appropriately decided with judicial methods.299
Indeed, the courts have far less discretion in making decisions
under supermajority rules than they do when they decide tradi-
tional individual rights cases. As discussed above, when inter-
preting an absolute limitation such as the First Amendment, the
courts make virtually all of the important substantive decisions
as to whether speech may be restrained."' 0 By contrast, under a
supermajority rule for spending, for example, the courts simply
would decide whether the legislation authorizes spending and
therefore requires a supermajority to pass. The courts do not
decide when or whether such spending is justified.
Finally, the courts also have less incentive to depart from the
actual meaning of a supermajority rule than that of an absolute
limitation. As noted above, under an absolute limitation, there is
297. See Frug, supra note 292, at 740; Fuller, supra note 281, at 400-01.
298. See Frug, supra note 292, at 740.
299. By contrast, under absolute constitutional limitations, courts would be asked to
interpret provisions governing, for example, the type of reasons why debt could be
issued or whether debt could be issued at a particular time. These decisions might
require the court to make sophisticated economic and political judgments about the
need for debt. Such decisions are not normally thought to be appropriate areas for
the application of legal principles and reasoned elaborations. See, e.g., Laurence H.
Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role,
97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 441-42 (1983) (arguing that extremely detailed amendments,
such as the proposed Balanced Budget Amendment, are ill-suited for the Constitu-
tion as it imposes certain functional constraints). Rather, these decisions are based
on weighing competing values and the state of the economy.
300. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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a danger that a strong political consensus may develop in sup-
port of legislation that the limitation prohibits.0 1 This would be
an especially serious problem in the fiscal area, where constitu-
tional provisions impinge on the core activities of the political
branches and the courts are not viewed as having an important
role. Fiscal supermajority rules blunt attacks on the courts be-
cause Congress has the final say.
C. A Supermajority Rule for Regulatory Legislation
Another category for possible application of supermajority
rules is regulatory law. Like government spending, regulatory
legislation can promote the public interest, as when it corrects
an externality, or it can further private interests, as when it re-
distributes productive opportunities from one group to anoth-
er.30 2 Moreover, just as concentrated interest groups have an
advantage over the diffuse public in obtaining spending for
themselves, they have a similar advantage in securing regulato-
ry legislation that provides them with rents.33 A supermajority
rule for all regulatory legislation would not, however, filter pub-
lic interest legislation from private interest legislation as well as
a supermajority rule for spending. The reasons for this conclu-
sion provide a checklist of the considerations necessary for de-
ciding whether to adopt supermajority rules.
First, public interest regulatory legislation is more likely to
have concentrated special interest opponents than public inter-
est spending legislation. 0" For instance, consider legislation
seeking to regulate the pollution caused by a production pro-
cess. 0 5 The producing companies are a concentrated interest
301. See supra text accompanying notes 283-87.
302. For a discussion of government action that corrects externalities, see MUELLER,
supra note 30, at 25, and government action that simply redistributes under the
guise of such correction, see id at 235-38.
303. For a discussion of the advantages concentrated interest groups enjoy over
diffuse interest groups in the political process, see supra notes 40-66 and accompany-
ing text.
304. See, e.g., Barbara H. Doerr, Note, Prosecuting Corporate Polluters: The Spar-
ing Use of Criminal Sanctions, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 659, 665 n.39 (1985).
305. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIV]NG THE
REGULATORY STATE 24-29 (1990).
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group ready to resist any effort to make them internalize their
costs. 30 6 Those suffering the widespread effects of pollution, on
the other hand, are a classic instance of a diffiise group that is
less effective at defending its interests in the political process.0 7
Thus, supermajority rules for regulatory legislation often would
have the perverse effect of strengthening the hand of the special
interests.
Second, as noted above, special interests more often face sub-
stantial opposition in obtaining private interest regulatory legis-
lation than in obtaining private interest spending legislation
because such regulatory legislation often harms more concen-
trated interest groups.3" As the public arena is not as skewed in
favor of rent-seeking regulatory legislation as it is in favor of
special interest spending, supermajority rules are less necessary
to correct an imbalance.
One response to these objections might be to. apply
supermajority rules only to classes of legislation that make it
easier for special interests to redistribute resources or opportuni-
ties to themselves. For instance, the supermajority rule could be
applied only to regulatory laws that have disproportionate inter-
est group support. The difficulty of clearly defining what consti-
tutes disproportionate support, however, would make such a
supermajority rule less effective because of the greater possibili-
ty of error when judges interpret an ambiguous rule.0 9 This un-
derscores a general point: supermajority rules work best when
they apply to well-defined categories.
306. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Reme-
dies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 123 (1985) (suggests that pollution-
producing companies should be forced to internalize costs and harms imposed on
others).
307. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, Path-Dependence, Public Choice,
and Transition in Russia: A Bargaining Approach, 4 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY
379, 386 (1995) (noting that highly organized special interest groups provide better
political support to politicians than do diffuse interest groups).
308. See supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Brian Winters, Logic and Legitimacy: The Uses of Constitutional Ar-
gument, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 263, 287 (1998) (acknowledging the difficulty in
correctly interpreting ambiguous rules).
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III. SUPERMAJORITY RULES AND THE CIVIc LIFE OF CITIZENS
In addition to leading to more efficient spending, our proposed
fiscal supermajority rules also would advance important social
goals. In this section, we argue that these supermajority rules
would improve the moral and political life of citizens as well as
promoting federalism, freedom, and private associations.
First, one of the greatest benefits of supermajority rules is the
positive moral and political values that they help to instill in
politicians and citizens. Under the existing regime of rule by
legislative majority, because special interests can use the state
to acquire private interest goods for themselves, each citizen
naturally will regard his fellow citizens either as sources of
wealth that he can seize or as threats to his wealth. The result
is a political world of suspicion and division as citizens are pit-
ted directly against one another in a litany of spending decisions
that benefit some at the expense of others. In fact, the current
political system provides incentives for politicians to encourage
the formation of more divisive special interest groups because
these groups may become a source of additional political sup-
port.31
0
In sharp contrast, supermajority rules make it harder to cre-
ate a legislative agenda based on either satisfying merely paro-
chial interests or obtaining transfer payments for particular
groups."'1 The requirement of greater consensus to pass legisla-
tion leads to a legislative agenda that appeals to a wide range of
citizens.31 2 The search for this agenda in turn encourages citi-
zens and politicians to ponder the aspirations and needs they
310. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Health Care Reform: Perspectives
From the Economic Theory of Regulation and the Economic Theory of Statutory In-
terpretation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1434, 1441 (1994) (discussing the tendency of poli-
ticians to structure the polity in a manner that will increase the demand for their
services).
311. Cf. Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with
Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 591-92 (1994) (stating that supermajority rules
required for constitutional amendments create a process that is more directed to the
public good than either ordinary legislation or plebiscites).
312. See Robert S. Leach, Comment, House Rule XXI and an Argument Against a
Constitutional Requirement for Majority Rule in Congress, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1253,
1284-85 (1997).
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have in common. Such a political process would unite the citi-
zenry because, in a world with consensus spending, citizens are
more likely to identify with the polity as a whole rather than see
themselves as part of an embattled minority struggling to obtain
its share of government spoils.
313
Indeed, the supermajority process for spending ultimately has
the capacity to improve citizens' views of one another. Under
supermajority rules, we would less often see each other a? tar-
gets or threats in a zero-sum game of resource redistribution.
Instead, we would more often treat one another as ends rather
than as means, an ideal liberalism has sought since the Enlight-
enment.314
A second benefit of supermajority rules is that they promote
federalism. By making it more difficult for Congress to pass leg-
islation, supermajority rules would constrain the powers of the
federal government and help to preserve the authority of the
states to take actions without congressional interference. It is
true, of course, that supermajority rules would not guarantee
that any particular area would be entirely free of federal inter-
ferences, as the Framers' original design based on enumerated
powers sought to do. Nonetheless, supermajority rules would
reduce the amount of federal legislation in general. Moreover,
because supermajority rules filter out bad legislation, they
should also tend to block laws disproportionately in areas where
the states legislate well, but to allow federal laws in areas
where national legislation is needed.
Another benefit of fiscal supermajority rules is the increased
freedom they bring to individuals.3 5 The current excessive
spending by the government leaves individuals with less money
to spend on individual enterprises and projects of their own
choosing. Additional government spending also results in a larger
and more powerful bureaucratic state.1 6 Such states provide
313. See id; see also MATr RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS
AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 262-65 (1996) (asserting that a less intrusive
government-such as one bound by supermAjority rules--creates greater civic virtue).
314. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46-
48 (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785).
315. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 8 (Oxford University Press, 1963) (1859).
316. See Niskanen, supra note 135, at 630-35.
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more opportunities for the exercise of arbitrary interference with
freedom.31 Supermajority rules would reduce the size and intru-
siveness of government, allowing individuals a greater measure
of freedom.
Finally, supermajority rules also promote the growth of pri-
vate associations. The large government produced by the special
interest state has tended to crowd out many kinds of private as-
sociations. 8' Because of the higher taxes necessary to pay for in-
creased spending, citizens have fewer resources to create and
sustain civic associations than they would otherwise. Moreover,
because citizens see the government as responsible for address-
ing social issues, they are motivated less to organize privately to
tackle those issues."1 9 In the latter half of this century, mediat-
ing institutions therefore have declined in power. 2 '
In contrast, by providing a civic world in which private citi-
zens have more resources and more responsibility for solving
social problems, supermajority rules have the potential to rein-
vigorate private associations and thereby create a social fabric
richer in mutual aid and trust.321 First, such associations often
perform functions, such as providing charity to the poor, more
efficiently than government because they have information and
initiative that government bureaucracies cannot replicate.2 2 Sec-
ond, such associations have the .capacity to mediate between the
individual and the state, reducing the discrepancy in power be-
tween the citizen and government in a manner that reduces gov-
ernmental arbitrariness and abuse of power.323 Third, private
317. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 4, 15 (1987).
318. Government spending is only likely to increase the number of associations
whose primary purpose is to influence the direction of government spending. We al-
ready have discussed the unfortunate effects of such special interest groups. See su-
pra Section I.A2.
319. See Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty In Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945, 1010 (1990).
320. See Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 229,
234-39 (1993) (discussing the decline of mediating institutions).
321. For a discussion of the manner in which civic associations create trust among
citizens, see RIDLEY, supra note 313, at 247-65.
322. See MARViN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION 222-24 (1992)
(arguing that private assistance has helped the poor to help themselves, whereas
public assistance has been structured to create a culture of dependency).
323. See Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century,
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associations offer the opportunity for individuals to become part
of networks of trust and succor that unlock altruism and fellow-
feeling.324 Finally, private associations allow individuals to de-
velop talents and affections that they cannot nurture as easily at
home or in the political realm. 25 Of course, no system will elim-
inate conflict, dispel all alienation and cynicism, and bring about
utopia; but at the heart of our case for supermajority rules,
there is a moral vision of social harmony and cooperation.
IV. ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS
This section answers the most common objections to fiscal
supermajority rules. First, we address the major practical objec-
tions that have been made against fiscal supermajority rules-
that realistic legal standards are both not available in fiscal
matters and not susceptible of judicial enforcement. Second, we
rebut the theoretical objection that fiscal supermajority rules are
inconsistent with democracy. Third, we consider a recurring poli-
cy complaint-that supermajority rules are unfair to the poor by
making it difficult to pass programs that benefit them. Finally,
we argue that fiscal supermajority rules are superior to cam-
paign finance reform-the structural change to our political sys-
tem that is touted most often as the way to curb the special in-
terest state.
A. Enforcement Objections to Fiscal Supermajority Rules
There have been two practical objections to supermajority
rules, that have been made often in the context of discussing the
Balanced Budget Amendment. 26 The first is that legal stan-
57 U. PIrr. L. REv. 423, 430 (1996) (discussing the need for mediating institutions
to protect individuals against the power of the state).
324. See ALEXIS DE ToCQUEVILLE, THE OLD RMGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
xiii (Stuart Gilbert trans., Doubleday Anchor 1955) (1856); Bruce C. Hafen, Schools
as Intellectual and Moral Associations, 1993 BYU L. REv. 605, 615 (discussing the
manner in which mediating institutions create social stability by nurturing
communitarian feelings).
325. See OLASKY, supra note 322, at 219-20 (discussing compassionate groups that
.emphasized personal contact with the poor, even when some of their members were
stunned by the firsthand experience").
326. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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dards concerning fiscal matters cannot be framed to capture fis-
cal realities. The second is that such standards would offer ex-
cessive discretion to the judiciary, providing it with too much
unconstrained authority over the budgetary affairs of the na-
tion. 27
Both objections may be put in the form of a dilemma. First, if
the rules were made simple and straightforward, the legislature
would be able to manipulate them through creative accounting
of revenue and debt; but if the rules were made sufficiently com-
plex to constrain the legislature, they would be too complicated
to enforce neutrally.328 Second, if the rules were not enforced by
the judiciary, they would become a hollow promise, threatening
the credibility of. the entire Constitution. But, if the judiciary
were authorized to enforce fiscal restraints, this authority would
aggrandize the courts and entangle them in tasks to which they
are inherently unsuited.3 29 These dilemmas have a certain de-
structive synergy. Insofar as the rules are complex enough to re-
strain the legislature's decisionmaking, they provide additional
discretion to the judiciary and make its role even more inappro-
priate.
We believe that the two-part supermajority rules that we pro-
pose can be crafted to resolve these dilemmas. First, our rules
require the definition of only two fiscal concepts-expenditures
and entitlements-and we are able to define those concepts
through the simplest of accounting rules, cash accounting. Sec-
ond, by authorizing the President to sequester funds that are
spent in violation of the rules, we minimize the need for judicial
intervention.
1. Standards That Capture Fiscal Reality
Unlike the Balanced Budget Amendment, the rules proposed
here require only relatively simple concepts to be defined. The
current version of the Balanced Budget Amendment requires the
327. See Tribe, supra note 299, at 441 n.38 (arguing against a Balanced Budget
Amendment because the judicial role would be too intrusive).
328. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust: A Post-Mortem, 5 GEO.
MASON L. Rv. 411, 411-12 (1997).
329. See Tribe, supra note 299, at 441.
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definition of debt, revenues, and expenditures.3 3 ' Debt, in par-
ticular, is a complex concept, as corporate finance has demon-
strated.33'
In contrast, our spending supermajority rule limits govern-
ment expenditures in the current year whenever, they exceed
ninety percent of the previous year's expenditures. We thus need
to define only the concept of expenditures. Moreover, we can de-
fine expenditures in a very simple way-through cash basis ac-
counting. Under cash accounting, a government expenditure is
recognized in the year in which the government actually makes
the cash payments. 3 2 Accordingly, there should be little dispute
over whether there was an expenditure, or the year in which it
occurred.
We acknowledge that, in the context of the Balanced Budget
Amendment, cash accounting has been criticized strongly as fail-
ing to take account of the complex fiscal realities of government
spending.33 3 For instance, on a cash accounting basis, current
Social Security obligations would not be recognized until cash
expenditures are made generations later.334 If obligations are not
recognized in the year incurred, Congress can avoid limitations
on issuing debt.3 5
If a fiscal rule requires a precise yearly measurement of debt
or expenditures, a strong argument can be made that accrual
accounting should be used because it more accurately reflects
fiscal reality.3 6 Accrual accounting records expenditures as actual
330. See Seto, supra note 151, at 1478-83.
331. See id at 1489-92 (discussing the difficulties of defining debt). For instance, it
is not easy to determine whether the .issuance of stock by government agencies
should be understood as debt. See id. at 1491.
332. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR
LAWYERS 34 (1997) (describing and critiquing cash basis accounting).
333. See Seto, supra note 151, at 1479-82 (discussing the accounting question as
the major drafting issue for the Balanced Budget Amendment).
334. See id at 1480. Some versions of the Balanced Budget Amendment therefore
would allow the legislature to engage in covert spending without having those ex-
penditures counted against the deficit. See i&. at 1490.
335. See idL at 1486.
336. See, e.g., id at 1463 (arguing that accrual accounting rules are superior to the
cash method in supporting the conclusion that some deficit spending is beneficial in
a formulaic balanced budget test).
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obligations when those obligations are incurred. 37 Thus, a Social
Security obligation would be recorded when Congress created
the entitlement rather than when the cash was paid out. A sig-
nificant defect of such rules is that they require more judicial
discretion in their application because the marker of a cash pay-
out is absent. For instance, calculating the cost of Medicare un-
der accrual accounting would require a complex set of assump-
tions and projections regarding the future.38
Our ninety percent rule, however, does not require a precise
measurement of expenditures to perform its function and there-
fore does not require accrual accounting. The primary purpose of
the ninety percent rule is to ensure that total spending is autho-
rized by a supermajority while mitigating holdout problems. 39
The rule can accomplish this purpose without precisely measur-
ing actual spending because ninety percent of the previous
year's spending will always be much less than Congress actually
desires to spend.340 Even if Congress can manipulate spending
under cost accounting to a certain extent, it is unlikely to be
able to manipulate it enough to make spending at ninety percent
of the previous year appear desirable.341 Consequently, manip-
ulation will not allow Congress to avoid having to secure a
supermajority to authorize the total amount of spending that it
seeks to enact.342 Simple cost accounting standards, which give
little discretion to the judiciary, therefore will be sufficient to
police the ninety percent rule.
337. See CUNNINGHAA, supra note 332, at 34-35 (describing accrual based accounting).
338. See Kenneth R. Wing, American Health Policy in the 1980's, 36 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 608, 618-28 (1986) (discussing the many variables on which future Medicare
costs depend, such as longevity and frequency of utilization of health services).
339. See supra Section I-.3.
340. In modern history, government spending has never declined by 10%. See supra
note 145.
341. Even if Congress could manipulate enough big programs in a single year to
avoid the supermajority requirement, this would be a one-year phenomenon. In the
next year, the amount that Congress could spend without a supermajority would be
even lower, because spending in the previous year, under cost accounting, would
have been very low.
342. If manipulation will not allow Congress to avoid the supermajority require-
ment, it is unlikely that the rule will induce Congress to engage in any manipu-
lation.
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Similarly, a cash accounting method may police the rule re-
quiring a supermajority to enact new entitlement spending. 4
Almost any entitlement requires some spending on a cash basis
in its first year even if its obligations balloon for future genera-
tions. Thus, the hair-trigger on the rule makes complex calcu-
lations unnecessary and its simplicity makes it difficult to cir-
cumvent.
2. Minimizing Judicial Discretion
The two-part supermajority rules that we advocate also can be
structured to minimize the judicial intervention necessary for
successful enforcement.3 4' We propose to make the President,
343. We propose a two-part definition of entitlement. The first part would define an
entitlement program as a law that purports to establish an entitlement to benefits
to all persons who satisfy certain conditions. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS: EXPOSURE DRAFT 44
(1993). This definition would cover virtually all existing entitlements programs. If
the Constitution defined the term entitlement in this manner, however, we would
predict that Congress would attempt to restructure the programs to avoid the
supermajority requirement. We anticipate two such maneuvers.
First, Congress might pass an otherwise ordinary entitlement program that nev-
ertheless explicitly allows Congress to eliminate the permanent appropriation that
pays for the program. In the event of such a congressional decision, the law would
instruct the executive to eliminate all program benefits. A program so structured
would not meet the above definition of an entitlement, because the right to benefits
would be contingent on the congressional decision. The program would effectively
function like an entitlement program, however, because like ordinary entitlements, it
would require payment of predetermined benefits unless Congress chooses to pass a
law that has the effect of reducing benefits.
Second, Congress might pass an otherwise ordinary entitlement program with
one modification: the executive has discretion to eliminate all benefits if it concludes
it would be in the public interest. This program also would not meet the above defi-
nition of an entitlement, because it would not necessarily entitle given individuals to
benefits. A program so structured would nevertheless function like an entitlement,
because it is unlikely that the executive would choose to take the political heat for
ending the program.
Extending the definition of entitlement as follows can impede these maneuvers
around the entitlement supermajority rule: An entitlement also includes a law that
otherwise would be an entitlement except that (1) it grants discretion to the execu-
tive to eliminate benefits or appropriations, or (2) it grants discretion to the legisla-
ture to eliminate appropriations by amending the existing appropriation.
344. It is a common assumption that fiscal provisions require more judicial inter-
pretation than other constitutional provisions. We do not believe this assumption is
necessarily true. Certainly "debt," "outlays," and "revenues" are terms with at least a
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rather than the judiciary, the initial monitor of whether the leg-
islature has complied with the supermajority rules. The ninety
percent rule would state that the initial remedy for spending
that exceeds the ninety percent level without being authorized
by a supermajority vote is a proportional sequester of outlays by
the President. That is, the President would be able to order a
reduction of expenditures by an equal percentage in all areas
(other than interest on the debt).34 5 Similarly, the initial remedy
for the creation of an entitlement without a supermajority vote
would be to prohibit the President from enforcing the entitle-
ment legislation. This feature of our supermajority rules reduces
judicial involvement in two important ways. First, it places the
initial responsibility on the executive rather than the judiciary
for enforcement of the rule. The judiciary thus will become in-
volved only if both political branches fail in their role-Congress
must enact more than ninety percent of the previous year's bud-
get without the resolution of a supermajority, and the President
must fail to sequester. Moreover, if the matter had to be adjudi-
cated, the courts simply would order the executive to implement
a proportional sequester. Under this arrangement, the courts
could make use of the executive's budget expertise in determin-
ing the amount of the sequester. 46
Second, a presidential sequester would deter congressional
violations of the rule. The sequester inevitably would provide
the President with some discretion over spending reductions
clear, technocratic core. There is no reason that the judiciary could not gain exper-
tise in applying them as rapidly as it gained expertise in applying the terms of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The authority to determine their meaning confers less
wide-ranging power on the courts than disputes concerning more philosophically lad-
en terms like "equal protection" or "freedom of speech." See Sheldon D. Pollack, Con-
stitutional Interpretation as Political Choice, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 989, 1018-19 (1987)
(noting the potentially open-ended nature of terms such as "equal protection").
345. If a sequester failed to remedy overspending in violation of the supermajority
rule, the amendment would require Congress to authorize retroactively that excess
spending in the next year. Congress, therefore, would be required in the next year
to authorize spending not simply in the amount that it intends to spend, but also
the excess from the previous year. Failure to authorize this amount would require
another sequester.
346. See Stith, supra note 149, at 601-02 (discussing the history behind placing
budgetary expertise and power within the executive branch of government).
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(even though these reductions should be proportional in princi-
ple). Lodging this discretion in the President would provide an
additional incentive to Congress to comply with the amendment
because Congress would not want to provide its political rival
with the opportunity to exercise such power. 47
Finally, in order to ensure that the judiciary has an opportu-
nity to enforce the supermajority rule as a last resort, the con-
stitutional amendment establishing the supermajority rule also
should provide for a particular cause of action. This action would
enable any taxpayer to challenge expenditures that exceeded
ninety percent of the previous year's budget but were not autho-
rized by the requisite supermajority. Without such an action, it
is possible that no one would have standing to enforce the
amendment because the Constitution generally forbids taxpayer
standing.3 This constitutional cause of action, however, would
be circumscribed carefully to avoid excessive judicial interven-
tion; it would not extend to taxpayer suits claiming that a se-
quester by the executive was excessive or disproportionate. Be-
cause the supermajority rule is designed to correct excessive
spending, the constitutional amendment need not create an ac-
tion to review other issues. 49 Of course, Congress can establish
statutory causes of actions for these other issues to the extent
permitted by traditional standing principles.
347. Nevertheless, we do not believe that this feature of the rule is open to the
objection that it is so unfavorable to Congress that Congress would never propose a
constitutional amendment establishing a supermajority rule. Because the 90% rule
almost always would be satisfied, see supra notes 242.45 and accompanying text, the
presidential sequester would be invoked rarely.
348. Taxpayer standing has been recognized only in a narrow class of individual
rights cases. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (viewing taxpayer standing for cer-
tain Establishment Clause claims as a narrow exception to the general rule preclud-
ing taxpayer standing).
349. As we have explained, the political system gives Congress and the President
an incentive to spend excessively. It therefore is unlikely that the President would
sequester excessive amounts, especially when he knows that many members of Con-
gress will publicly criticize him if he does.
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B. The Democracy Objection
This section responds to the argument that supermajority
rules are antidemocratic. First, we show that this argument con-
flicts with American constitutionalism because the Constitution
is full of provisions that restrain national majorities. In addition,
we show that this argument exalts form over substance. Majori-
ty rule provides disproportionate leverage to certain groups in
spending determinations because of the presence of special inter-
ests.5 Supermajority rules actually would promote more equal
influence to the average citizen in the political process.
1. Democracy and Constitutionalism
The democratic objection to supermajority rules cannot be
squared with the central premise of American constitutionalism
that, to prevent tyranny, it is essential for a majority to
precommit to institutions that constrain the majority in the fu-
ture.35' Examples of such precommitments include the keystones
of the Bill of Rights and the structure of federalism, both of
which have frustrated the power of national majorities.3 2 In the
United States, substantial majorities have been willing to enter
into such precommitments both at the time of the framing and
through enactment of subsequent constitutional amendments.
These actions over the course of American history reveal a para-
dox at the core of any objection to supermajority rules based on
simple democracy-to implement legislative majority rule, one
would need to ignore the consistent wishes of popular majorities
throughout American history to restrain legislative minorities. 3
A supermajority rule for spending decisions would be, in this
regard, no different than previous constitutional limitations. If
adopted by a constitutional amendment, a supermajority rule
350. See supra Section I.A.2.
351. See Michael McClosky, The Fallacy of Absolute Majority Rule, 11 J. POL. 637,
645 (1949).
352. Other examples include the separation of powers and bicameralism. See supra
notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
353. See DAVID SPITz, DEMOCRACY AND THE CHALLENGE OF POWER 150-60 (1958);
ELAINE SPiTZ, MAJORITY RuLE 111 (1984).
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will have been adopted by a consensus that represents more
than a majority of voters. 4
2. Democracy and Equal Influence
Even if one ignores the limits that constitutionalism places on
democracy, the claim that supermajority rules are inconsistent
with democracy is still mistaken. In its most general conception,
democracy since its invention in ancient Greece has had two
fundamental goals. First, under democracy, the people or their
representatives rather than any fixed class or individual make
major governmental decisions. Both classical and renaissance
political theorists contrasted democracy in this respect with oli-
garchy and monarchy. 55 Second, it has been a hallmark of de-
mocracy since Aristotle that government decisions are to be tak-
en after discussion.356
354. Under Article V, a supermajority rule could be incorporated into the Constitu-
tion only by an amendment proposed by two-thirds of the House or Senate, or by a
constitutional convention called by two-thirds of the states, and then adopted by ma-
jorities of legislatures in three-quarters of the states. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
355. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, 208-11 (Ernest Barker ed. &
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (contrasting democracy with oligarchy and monar-
chy); NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 109 (Bernard Crick ed. & Leslie J.
Walker trans., 1970) (1531) (describing different principles based on democracy, aris-
tocracy, and monarchy).
356. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 355, at 123, 126. As Ernest Barker noted:
The people at large have the merit of a good collective judgement not as
a static mass, but when they are dynamic-in other words when they
assemble, and when the process of debate begins. It is thus not an un-
fair gloss to suggest that Aristotle by implication assumes that the dia-
lectic of debate is the final foundation of the principle of popular govern-
ment . . . . In other words, democracy is based upon discussion.
Id at 126 n.1. Deliberation is valued because it helps those assembled reach deci-
sions that are measured and considered rather than impulsive. See GEORGE F. WILL,
RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY 122-28 (1992). Deliberation also encourages individuals to make arguments ap-
pealing to shared interests, thus creating a greater focus on the common good. See
Thomas Gals & Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation:
A Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1291, 1301 (1995). Fi-
nally, deliberation sometimes is claimed to be a good, independent of any improve-
ment in decisionmaking, because it connects us to others, allowing us to flourish
collectively in a way we could not individually. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 355, at 5;
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 11 (1988);
Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and
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Legislative supermajority rules of a modest degree (from
three-fifths to two-thirds) do not in any way contravene this
broad conception of democracy. Like majority rule, supermajority
rule entrusts government to the representatives of people rather
than to a fixed class and requires that decisions be made after
discussion."' A supermajority rule would offend democracy only
if one added the requirement that each legislator possess formal-
ly equal voting influence on each piece of legislation.358
We believe that this formal principle cannot be considered
part of the historic core of democracy. Before we offer reasons for
rejecting it, however, we observe that the supermajority rules
that we advocate detract from the principle of formal equal in-
fluence only to a limited degree. Under supermajority rules,
each legislator continues to have only a single vote.3 59 It is true
that a supermajority rule will advantage some legislators and
the voters they represent by making it easier for them to block
spending legislation of which they disapprove. Over time, how-
ever, these same legislators and voters may be disadvantaged as
the supermajority rule makes it harder for them to enact spend-
ing legislation they desire. Thus, a supermajority rule may cre-
ate a diffuse equality of influence. Although one might attack
this point as merely theoretical if representatives of the same
individuals were advantaged repeatedly by the supermajority
rule, 60 the conditions of modern society assure that it is a prac-
the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 331, 345-54 (1994).
357. Supermajority rules may also promote more deliberation. Jury deliberations
provide some relevant evidence. It is well known that jurors deliberate more as the
percentage of jurors required for decision is increased: unanimity rules engender
more deliberation than supermajority rules, and supermajority rules engender more
deliberation than majority rules. See Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handi-
capped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 687, 708-09 (1990).
358. This principle might be thought necessary if we were to infuse democracy with
an equality principle. An emphasis on equality in a democracy, however, could lead
as logically to a unanimity requirement as to a majority requirement; citizens are
treated equally only if nothing is exacted from any. citizen without his consent (or
that of his representative in a representative democracy). Under that version of the
equality principle, legislation therefore must receive the universal consent of every-
one affected.
359. See Joseph Jaconelli, Majority Rule and Special Majorities, 1989 PUB. L. 587,
608-09.
360. See id. This objection, however, can also be made against simple majority rule,
which, as we have shown, also provides different degrees of power to differently sit-
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tical truth.361 Because everyone has special interests regarding
some kinds of legislation and is a member of the diffuse public
for other kinds, everyone is advantaged and disadvantaged by
the rule in a fairly unpredictable manner.
In any event, the formal equality of influence principle must
be rejected because it exalts form over substance.6 2 Because of
the power of special interests, a formal rule of equal influence
when applied to legislative bodies may lead in practice to un-
equal influence among citizens.363 Under formal legislative
equality, members of special interests have more leverage over
legislation than members of the population as a whole. 64
Indeed, if democracy is to encompass an equality of influence
principle, it should focus on substance rather than form, requir-
ing rules that equalize actual influence. Supermajority rules
then would be mandated when they countervail the power of
special interests. 3 65 In fact, by reducing the power of special in-
uated groups. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
361. See Jaconelli, supra note 359, at 609 ("Over a sufficient span of time, a pat-
tern could emerge under which a special majority provision . . . might work to the
advantage in turn of each group within society.").
362. See Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governe& The Legitimacy of Constitution-
al Change, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 535, 562 (1995) ("Simple majority rule may be legit-
imate in one context while not in another. Its legitimacy depends upon the circum-
stances in which the voting protocol is meant to operate and the principles that gov-
ern the political system.").
363. See supra Section I.A.2.
364. For a description of this leverage, see id
365. The connection between supermajority rules and majority rule without special
interests is illustrated by the following informal model. In the model, legislators vote
for bills based on two kinds of popular support from voters. Most support derives
from individuals and diffuse, unorganized groups. Some support for bills, however,
derives from special interests, which are able to exercise significant influence beyond
their numbers. In this simple model, special interests always seek to benefit them-
selves through additional spending. All spending legislation is supported by a single
special interest, and each special interest has equal influence. In particular, each
special interest has the ability to influence 10% of the members of a legislative
body; thus, in a legislature with 100 members, a special interest can obtain 10 addi-
tional votes for spending programs that it supports.
If there were no special interests, legislation would pass under majority rule
only if it were popular enough with ordinary voters to receive the votes of 51 legis-
lators. Special interests, however, can use their influence to secure the passage of
legislation that would receive only 41 votes due to the support of ordinary voters.
Thus, special interest legislation passes only because of the disproportionate power of
special interests.
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terests, supermajority rules could cause the legislative process to
function as an idealized majoritarian process with no special
interests.366 Supermajority rules in a world with special inter-
ests may thus mimic majority rule in a world with no special
interests.367
Finally, the fundamental premise of the democracy objec-
tion-that supermajority rules constitute a sharp departure from
Under this model, a supermajority rule requiring the votes of 61 legislators to
pass legislation can eliminate the power of special interests entirely. Under a
supermajority rule, special interests will be able to secure the passage of legislation
that only has ordinary voter support from 51 legislators. This legislation would pass
under majority rule if there were no special interests. A supermajority rule therefore
can function to neutralize the power of special interests and promote an ideal ver-
sion of majority rule.
366. One might question the ability of any supermajority rule to mimic majority
rule perfectly in a world without special interests. First, it might be argued that not
all spending is supported by special interests. If there is some spending that is sup-
ported only by ordinary voters, the supermajority rule will impede this spending,
even though it receives 51 votes entirely from ordinary voters in the model dis-
cussed above. We would argue, however, that virtually all spending has the support
of special interests. For instance, a new prison may be a legitimate public interest
good, but that does not mean that construction companies or prison guards will not
support legislation to erect the prison. Even if there were some spending bills that
special interests did not support, the question is how many bills qualify for this dis-
tinction. To conclude that a supermajority rule would move us away from idealized
majority rule, one must determine that there are more spending bills that are sup-
ported entirely by ordinary voters than there are spending bills that receive special
interest support.
A second criticism might focus on the model's assumption that one special in-
terest supports each spending bill and that all special interests have equal influence.
In reality, spending bills are supported by more than one special interest and some
special interests are stronger than others. The influence of these special interests
therefore may vary significantly with different kinds of spendinb. Nonetheless, even
if no supermajority rule can mimic majority rule perfectly in a world without special
interests, supermajority rules still can be designed that move us closer to the results
produced by a system of majority rule in a world without special interests.
367. Supermajority rules also may help solve some of the difficulties in determining
who is to count among those deserving of equal treatment. Society has been under-
stood as "a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those
who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born." EDMUND BURKE,
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 110 (Arlington House 1966) (1790). In
fact, much legislation in modern democracies-particularly legislation that creates
government debt-pervasively affects the interests of those who do not vote, such as
those under the voting age and those yet unborn. In the right circumstances,
supermajority rules (such as one applied to raising debt) therefore may protect the
interests of those not formally represented, promoting rather than undercutting the
substance of the equal influence principle.
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the tradition of majority rule-displays another fundamental
misunderstanding of the American constitutional system. All
rules that govern the legislature-whether majority rules,
supermajority rules, or absolute limitations-are in essence
supermajority rules. Legislative majority rule in the United
States is bicameral, and bicameralism in some forms has been
shown to approximate a mild form of supermajority rule.368 Ab-
solute constitutional limitations can be changed by a
supermajority through a constitutional amendment. In an ab-
stract sense, therefore, the Constitution is pervasively
supermajoritarian. The question is not whether we should adopt
supermajority rules, but rather what type of supermajority rules
we should employ.369
368. See supra note 97.
369. Supermajority rules are also a mechanism for stabilizing legislative decisions
without detracting from democratic decisionmaking. Theorists have shown that
majoritarian procedures are subject to cycling. Cycling in a legislature can occur
when more than two outcomes are possible and legislators do not rank the outcomes
in a consistent fashion. See KENNETH ARRow, SociAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VAL-
UES 3 (2d ed. 1963). For instance, consider three legislators A, B, and C and three
proposals a, b, and c. A prefers proposal a to proposal b, and proposal b to proposal
c. B prefers proposal b to proposal c, and proposal c to proposal a. C prefers propos-
al c to proposal a, and proposal a to proposal b. Thus, proposal a gains a majority
over proposal b, and proposal b gains a majority over proposal c. But proposal c
gains a majority over proposal a. Because of this cycle, the proposal to be ultimately
adopted by the legislature is indeterminate and will depend on the sequence in
which the proposals are considered in the legislative process. This is obviously not a
desirable feature in a democratic system since it generates arbitrary and fluctuating
outcomes. Political scientists have noted that such cycling is most likely to be pres-
ent in an omnibus bill that makes redistributionist transfers, such as spending bills.
See MUELLER, supra note 35, at 156-57. To prevent cycling, our legislatures give
substantial power to agenda setters, such as committee chairmen. See Daniel A.
Farber & Philip R. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv.
873, 903 (1987). But strong agenda setters detract from the equal participation in
legislation that may be thought important to democratic values.
Supermajority rules decrease cycling without the need for powerful agenda set-
ters. The proof of this fact is quite complicated, but intuitively the reasons are clear.
A unanimity rule prevents all cycling because any inconsistent preferences would
operate to prevent passage of any alternative. For instance, under a unanimity rule
neither proposal a, proposal b, or proposal c would be adopted. Supermajority rules
require a greater consensus for passage and thus make inconsistent preferences
count against enactment, thus reducing cycling. At some point, this effect is so pow-
erful that a supermajority rule prevents cycling. See MUELLER, supra note 35, at
157; Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, On a Sixty-Four Percent Majority Rule, 56
ECONOMETRICA 787 (1988) (proving, under certain assumptions, that a 64%
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C. The Claim That Supermajority Rules Hurt the Poor
Another objection to fiscal supermajority rules is that they
make it harder to redistribute resources to the poor.37v But even
assuming that such redistribution is a legitimate function of
government, we question the factual premise of this argument.
Majority rule does not particularly benefit the poor and, on cer-
tain realistic factual assumptions, actually harms the poor.
Politicians tend to redistribute resources to members of their
electoral majorities and especially to organized special interest
groups that support them.37' The question whether majority
rules help the poor therefore depends on whether the poor are
organized as a special interest group or are likely to be part of
the electoral majority of the politicians who gain office.
The poor are not more likely than other groups to support pol-
iticians who win elections. If we define the poor as the lowest
decile in income, a priori this decile is no more likely to be in
the majority than any other decile. Indeed, because the poor
vote less in percentage terms than other groups, 72 those in the
supermajority rule eliminates all cycling).
370. This is only one of several similar arguments against the constraints
supermajority rules impose on redistribution. One could identify any designated
group-including the poor, the middle class, or, women-and potentially complain
about the constraints supermajority rules impose on addressing issues of importance
to that group. One could even identify the class of the wealthy and complain that
supermajority rules make it more difficult to redistribute their wealth to everyone
else. We focus on the consequences of supermajority rules on the poor because we
believe that there is a more substantial consensus that society has an obligation to
pay particular attention to the effect of its rules on the poor.
371. Special interests may give support in the form of votes for politicians but they
also may provide support in the form of campaign contributions and other kinds of
support that promote election. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
372. In 1994, the percentage of individuals who voted rose sharply with income:
FAMILY INCOME PERCENT VOTING
Under $5,000 20.0
$5,000 - $9,999 23.5
$10,000 - $14,999 33.0
$15,000 - $24,999 40.4
$25,000 - $34,999 44.9
$35,000 - $49,999 50.1
$50,000 & over 60.6
Not reported 41.3
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lowest decile will have less political influence than wealthier
voters.
The poor are even less likely to organize as a special interest
group.373 The poor are a diffuse group and have few resources to
spend in becoming organized. Moreover, even if the poor did
form an organized group, they would be relatively ineffective
because they have little other than their votes to contribute to
the support of politicians. The consequences of this fact seem
apparent in the federal budget: the programs that are the
largest and have the most political support are not programs
for the poor, but instead are middle-class entitlements such as
Social Security.
37 4
There are two possible objections to our argument that the
poor are unlikely to be successful in the world of interest group
politics. First, one might argue that some of the legislation in-
tended to benefit other groups also benefits the poor: redistribu-
tions from the wealthy to the middle class arguably reach the
poor eventually. One might describe this as the trickle-down
theory of the welfare state.
This proposition, however, is unsupported by the evidence. For
instance, although the war on poverty created benefits for mid-
dle-class bureaucrats, there is substantial evidence that it actu-
ally hurt the poor.375 Similarly, legislation that benefits teachers'
unions seems to increase the drop-out rate in public high
schools, disproportionately hurting the poor.376 These results
See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Characteristics of the Voting-Age Population Report-
ed Having Registered or Voted& November 1994 (visited Aug. 26, 1998) <http'J/www.
census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/profile/ptablel.txt>; see also REFERENDUMS: A
COmPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 108 (David Butler & Austin Ranney
eds., 1978) ("Typically, lower socioeconomic groups-minorities, the poor, the unedu-
cated-vote in smaller relative numbers than do more privileged members of soci-
ety.").
373. See Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local
Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 479 (1996) (stating that
the poor, unlike the middle class, may lack the power to obtain redistributions).
374. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The Law Schools' Failing Grade on Federalism, 92
YALE L.J. 1349, 1353 (1983) (pointing out that middle-class entitlements crowd out
programs for the poor).
375. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION
AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 148-53 (1991); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND:
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 24-40 (1984).
376. See Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Produc-
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should not be surprising; there is no reason to believe that legis-
lation intended to help majoritarian interests or special interest
groups will systematically help other diffuse groups.
Moreover, the share of general resources shaken loose by such
legislation and incidentally shifted to the poor may be out-
weighed by the disincentives or other bad effects that the legis-
lation has on the poor.37 Welfare programs offer a prime exam-
ple. Powerful public service unions support welfare because it
requires a structure that provides jobs to their members. 378 The
disincentives to work caused by welfare are at best irrelevant to
the interests of union members. Thus, the members oppose pro-
grams to alleviate such disincentives whenever such programs
would threaten their interests even mildly, as when welfare re-
cipients are given jobs that conceivably could be given to union
members.379  Even worse, unions may benefit from these
disincentives because the permanence of poverty assures their
members' stable employment.
Second, one might argue that even if the poor are unlikely to
be part of the winning coalition that confers government bene-
fits, they have few resources to lose when they are in the minor-
ity. The net benefits over time are therefore positive for the
poor, because they are immune from redistributive losses but
sometimes are part of the winning coalition and receive benefits.
Once again, this proposition is open to substantial doubt. It is
true that the poor possess fewer assets and opportunities to lose
than the rich. But legislation that deprives the poor of the limit-
ed resources they do have may harm them disproportionately.
tion, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671, 700-09 (1996). See generally Peter Brimelow & Leslie
Spencer, The National Extortion Association?, FORBES, June 7, 1993, at 72, 74 (de-
tailing the power of teachers' unions to get benefits for themselves rather than for
the students in the schools in which they serve).
377. See DWIGHT R. LEE & RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, FAILURE AND PROGRESS: THE
BRIGHT SIDE OF THE DISMAL SCIENCE 109 (1993) (detailing the disincentive effects of
welfare programs on the poor).
378. See LEO TROY, THE NEW UNIONISM IN THE NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC SECTOR UN-
IONS IN THE REDISTRIBUTIVE STATE 136 (1994) ("To make further gains in member-
ship, influence and power, public sector unions would naturally return to that well-
spring and demand more government intervention on their behalf.").
379. See Ron Susldnd, Labor is Pushing Clinton to Make Sure Changes in Welfare
System Won't Threaten Union Jobs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1994, at A16.
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For example, the flat Social Security payroll tax may harm the
poor significantly because the money that they forego might
have been used for necessities.8 ° Moreover, characteristics that
correlate with poverty, such as a limited education, also may
make it harder for the poor to circumvent legislation that re-
stricts their opportunities.38' Thus, the adverse effects of
redistributive legislation on the poor are likely to be longer
lasting. 82
D. Supermajority Rules Are Superior to Campaign Finance
Reform
Another argument against supermajority rules is that some
other reform will better restrain the power of special interests.
The alternative proposed most often is campaign finance reform.
Although campaign finance proposals come in many varieties,
they generally include a ceiling on the total amount of money
that a candidate may spend to be elected, together with strict
limitations on how much any individual or corporate entity can
contribute to a campaign.3 In their strongest form, such propos-
als argue that Buckley v. Valeo3 84 should be overruled so that
such limitations are immune from searching scrutiny under the
First Amendment."8 5
380. Similarly, legislation requiring only union workers on construction projects may
have a very large effect on the unskilled workers who do not belong to unions pre-
cisely because they have few opportunities. Indeed, Professor Bernstein has shown
that the purpose of Davis-Bacon legislation was to help unions avoid competition
from lower wage workers, particularly ethnic minorities. See David E. Bernstein,
Roots of the 'Underclass': The Decline of Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of
Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 113-18 (1993).
381. The poor are on average less well educated. See Jane E. Larson, Free Markets
Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179, 219 n.216 (1995) (citing BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EARNINGS LADDER 2-3 (1994)). The
poor's lack of education also may make it difficult for them to adjust as quickly as
other groups.
382. Moreover, if supermajority rules increase economic growth, the poor will bene-
fit as well.
383. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1054-55 (1996).
384. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Supreme Court in Buckley held that limits on cam-
paign expenditures violated the First Amendment. See id. at 51.
385. For an argument that Buckley should be overruled, see Vincent Blasi, Free
464 [Vol. 40:365
SUPERMAJORITY RULES
Advocates of campaign finance reform suggest that their pro-
posals would reduce the power of special interests in the politi-
cal process by diminishing the leverage that special interests
derive from their donations.38 ' Limitations on contributions are
designed to prevent any single group from gaining undue lever-
age. 87 A ceiling on spending by candidates reduces the aggre-
gate influence of special interests, thereby increasing the influ-
ence of ordinary citizens.
38 8
Campaign finance reform, however, is inferior to
supermajority rules in dissolving the special interest state. First,
it is unlikely that campaign finance reform can be enacted in a
way that applies neutrally to the contributions of all special in-
terest groups. Enacting any reform in its theoretically pristine
form through a democratic process, including our own, is diffi-
cult. Campaign finance proposals, however, face peculiar prob-
lems. Constitutional reform is most likely to be successful when
politicians can only faintly see its adverse consequences on their
careers. As we have noted, however, rent-seeking by rulers is a
bane of all governmental structures and, in a democracy, one of
the prime concerns of rulers is to construct a system that will
keep them in office.38 9 Allowing legislators to write rules for
campaign finance is to invite their regulation of the single mat-
ter that most directly affects their self-interest.39 ° The effect of a
Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits
May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1324
(1994).
386. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 807-08 (1985).
387. See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A
Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1126, 1149
(1994).
388. See id. (postulating that campaign finance reform will open up the political
process to average citizens).
389. See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1414 (1994) (noting that there is good reason "to distrust any
campaign finance system enacted by Congress, whose institutional self-interest makes
this an especially worrisome area for national legislation").
390. It therefore is hardly surprising that the most touted reforms, such as ceilings
on spending, are likely to help incumbents. See Larry Sabato, Real and Imagined
Corruption in Campaign Financing, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 155, 169 (A.
James Reichley ed., 1987).
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supermajority rule on politicians' political careers depends on
unpredictable future issues, while the effect of campaign finance
rules can be predicted more accurately.
Campaign finance reform that is neither neutral nor compre-
hensive is unlikely to reduce special interest spending. Applied
selectively, limitations on campaign contributions and spending
will empower some special interests at the expense of those who
are barred from contributing, and may in fact increase the inci-
dence of redistributive legislation by removing countervailing
interests.39' Thus, if the likelihood of obtaining comprehensive
and neutral campaign finance reform from a self-interested leg-
islature is very low, the cost of bungled reform is likely to be
peculiarly high.392
Even if reform measures were enacted neutrally among con-
tributing interest groups, they would not reduce many sources of
special interest power. The ability to avoid free rider problems
creates the leverage of special interest groups and makes it
more cost-effective for their members to expend effort and ener-
gy to influence the process. 93 Monetary contributions are only
one means of influence.3 94 As long as such groups can advance
the electoral prospects of candidates through means other than
monetary contributions, they may continue to exercise dispropor-
tionate influence.395
One of the means that interest groups can use to exercise in-
fluence is to induce their constituents to vote for particular can-
didates based on narrow issues.3 96 For instance, unions are well-
positioned to publicize issues to their members and to get them
391. See Smith, supra note 383, at 1078 (noting that limitations on the influence of
the wealthy have the sum effect of benefitting those with access to other forms of
political power).
392. See id. at 1051.
393. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing various ways special
interest groups can influence the government disproportionately through their organi-
zational networks).
395. See Don M. Millis, Comment, The Best Laid Schemes of Mice and Men: Cam-
paign Finance Reform Gone Awry, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1465, 1485-93 (noting that spe-
cial interest groups will use other means, including covert ones, to influence the po-
litical process if they are denied the opportunity to make campaign contributions).
396. See id. at 1492 n.130.
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out to vote. 97 Similarly, the American Association of Retired
Persons wields more influence through its issue and mobiliza-
tion network than through campaign contributions. 398
Supermajority rules are superior to campaign finance proposals
precisely because they erect a barrier to the success of all special
interest proposals rather than a.barrier to one means of special
interest influence.399
Further, campaign finance reform, however structured, would
give substantial power to a single group: to those who express
themselves for a living, including journalists, academics, and
artists. Members of this "new class" have distinctive views on is-
sues by virtue of the kind of work they do and the kind of educa-
tion they received."' Campaign finance reform would increase
further the constitutional power of this class. Such reform re-
strains those who make their living in material production from
expressing themselves in the political process by contributing to
political candidates with whom they agree. It does not, however,
limit those who make their living by manipulating symbols from
communicating their political views. In seeking to resolve the
problem of special interests, campaign finance reform perversely
creates another group with disproportionate influence in the po-
litical process.
Finally, unlike supermajority rules, campaign finance reforms
are likely to reduce the amount of information and deliberation
in the political process.40 ' The special interest state is a threat to
397. See id
398. Some have suggested that campaign finance reform in fact disadvantages dif-
fuse groups more than concentrated interest groups because the ability of diffuse
groups to set up such networks and engage in other kinds of influence is in fact
less than their ability to make campaign contributions. See THOMAS GAis, IMPROPER
INFLUENcE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE PROBLEM
OF EQUALrrY 46-50 (1996).
399. Moreover, campaign finance reform proposals will tend to make it even harder
for diffuse groups to engage in the political process. Regulation favors groups with
the knowledge and resources to understand and manipulate the rules at the expense
of newcomers to the political process and grassroots campaigners. See id. at 181-82.
400. See Smith, supra note 383, at 1077-78. Unsurprisingly, the new class largely
favors campaign finance reform because such reform will increase its power. See id-
at 1049 nn.2-3.
401. See id at 1081-82 (criticizing many campaign finance reform proposals because
of their tendency to limit the number of viable candidates).
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our welfare, but so is a state driven by the passions of an igno-
rant citizenry. Political scientists have shown that rational igno-
rance is a structural feature of democracy; the average citizen
lacks the incentive to acquire political information because indi-
vidual inputs into the political process are unlikely to affect the
outcomes reached by government.a 2 The danger of political igno-
rance among the citizenry is exacerbated by mass entertainment
and advertising, in which political messages must compete with
many other well-crafted messages on subjects most people find
more amusing or useful than politics.0 3 Accordingly, politicians
and advocates need substantial sums of money to shape messag-
es that can be heard over the hubbub of modernity. Currently,
less is spent on political campaigns than on such inconsequen-
tial goods as potato chips, and the public is remarkably ill-in-
formed a. 40 Reducing the money spent on elections is likely to cre-
ate an even less informed citizenry. In contrast, supermajority
rules will not reduce, and may even enhance, democratic deliber-
ation. 0 5
CONCLUSION
Edmund Burke defended the Glorious Revolution on the
grounds that even revolution could be necessary to "preserve...
that antient constitution of government which is our only securi-
ty for law and liberty."0 6 He cautioned that the resulting refor-
mation should proceed "upon the principle of reference to antiq-
uity" and thus be "carefully formed upon analogical precedent,
authority, and example" of prior law.0 v
In this Article, we have endeavored to describe why fiscal
supermajority rules are a conservative innovation of the kind
402. For a discussion of rational ignorance, see supra note 50.
403. See John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the
First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 122 (1996) (discussing the problem politi-
cal messages face in competing with other messages that citizens may find more
useful or amusing).
404. See Smith, supra note 383, at 1058-60 (comparing expenditures on other goods
to take issue with those who contend that too much money is spent on campaigns).
405. See supra notes 365-67 and accompanying text.
406. BURKE, supra note 367, at 43.
407. Id
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that Burke celebrated. Supermajority rules in fact are needed to
perform a task analogous to that performed by structures of the
original Constitution that either are anachronistic or have fallen
into disrepair. Like federalism, supermajority rules can prevent
the government from becoming an engine for producing private
interest goods. Supermajority rules thus provide a contemporary
mechanism for controlling the power of factions to use govern-
ment for their own ends-the problem Madison considered most
central to sustaining republicanism.0
We recognize that even beneficial changes in a regime are
effectuated only with difficulty. As Machiavelli noted, innovation
in regimes "has as enemies all the people who were doing well
under the old order, and only halfhearted defenders in those
who hope to profit from the new."40 9 This halfheartedness "de-
rives partly... from human skepticism, since men don't really
believe in anything new till they have solid experience of it."4"0
We are optimistic, nevertheless, that supermajority rules can
command widespread support. Over time, a regime broadcasts
its pathologies so often that even the rationally ignorant become
aware of them. The burdens of our special interest state are now
so large and so persistent that the many diffuse interests are
aware of the need for change. One sign of this need is that all
sides of the political spectrum are pressing proposed constitu-
tional amendments that are best understood as proposals to dis-
solve the special interest state.
Another reason for optimism is that supermajority rules dis-
solve a prisoner's dilemma that makes society poorer. As we
have observed, a substantial majority of individuals would be
better off without excessive government spending. But no one
will give up their subsidies unless they can be certain that oth-
ers will give up theirs as well. As a solution to this prisoner's
dilemma, supermajority rules are squarely in the tradition of
innovative mechanisms that have prohibited similar tragedies of
the commons through the ages.
408. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
409. NIccoL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 17 (Robert M. Adams ed. & trans., Norton
1992) (1513).
410. I&
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By providing a theoretical framework for fiscal supermajority
rules and suggesting their optimal form, we propose substituting
for the special interest state an alternative whose specificity and
solidity will make it more compelling to those who might other-
wise be halfhearted in their attachment to reform. The wide
range of beneficial consequences produced by supermajority
rules should appeal to an equally wide range of citizens-from
those who want politics more centered on the common good to
those who want improved prospects for economic growth. As the
founding documents of our republic show, it is only on the basis
of such a broad appeal that we can accomplish such fundamen-
tal change.
